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PENNSYLVANIA'S
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND
RECLAMATION ACT: AN
ASSESSMENT OF HOW
"COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM" CAN
MAKE STATE REGULATORY
PROGRAMS MORE EFFECTIVE
John C. Dernbach*

People now appear to think that implementation should be
easy; they are, therefore, upset when expected events do not
occur or turn out badly. We would consider our effort a success
if more people began with the understandingthat implementation, under the best of circumstances, is exceedingly difficult.
They would, therefore, be pleasantly surprised when a few good
things really happened.
-Jeffrey

L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky**

The Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977 (SMCRA)1 was adopted because the states had inade*
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J. PRESSMAN

& A.

WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION at xviii-xix

(2d ed. 1979).

1. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982). To avoid confusion, SMCRA will be used throughout to refer to the Federal Act. The Pennsylvania Surface Mining Conservation and Rec-
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quately regulated the environmental effects of coal mining.2 In
response, the Act established minimum procedural and substantive requirements for coal mining operations and created the Office of Surface Mining (OSM) within the Department of the Interior to promulgate regulations and oversee the new regulatory
program. Significantly, SMCRA allows states to continue to regulate the environmental effects of coal mining if they can administer a regulatory program according to federal standards. Continued state regulation may be a paradox,' but it is also reality.
Virtually every major coal mining state in the country now has
primary jurisdiction, or primacy, to administer and enforce its
own coal mining program under SMCRA.'
The pattern is a familiar one in environmental legislation;
SMCRA is one of many "cooperative federalism" statutes that
were enacted in the last decade, beginning with the Clean Air
Act Amendments in 1970.1 Most of these laws can be justified
partly on the grounds that interstate economic competition
made it difficult, if not impossible, for the states to regulate adequately important environmental problems. As a remedy, Congress established minimum uniform standards and procedures
and offered the states an opportunity to enforce them.
Perhaps because it was adopted in the latter part of the decade after some experience with federal enforcement programs
was developed, or because it was digested for so long in Congress
before adoptionJ SMCRA contains features that are unparalleled in any of the other "cooperative federalism" environmental
statutes. Most significantly, it sets forth a comprehensive framework for mandatory enforcement responses by the regulatory
lamation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 1396.1-.31 (Purdon Supp. 1985), has the same
acronym (SMCRA), but will be referred to by its name.
2. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 51-52 (1977).
3. Rochow, The Far Side of Paradox:State Regulation of the EnvironmentalEffects
of Coal Mining, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 559 (1979).
4. See Squillace, Cooperative Federalism Under the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act: Is This Any Way to Run a Government?, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 687, 691
(1985).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982). Other laws patterned on the cooperative federalism
model include the Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982), the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982), and the Safe
Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-10 (1982) (enacted in 1974).
6. See 30 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (1982) (uniform standards necessary under SMCRA to
ensure that interstate coal competition does not undermine individual state standards);
Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1211-12 (1977).
7. For a brief history of SMCRA prior to adoption, see Comment, Cooperative Federalism and Environmental Protection: The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977, 58 TUL. L. REV. 299 (1983).
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agency to all violations of the Act or regulations.8 These and
other requirements were specifically designed to ensure the effectiveness of state programs.
Yet state regulatory programs under SMCRA frequently have
been described as inadequate-or worse. Reports continue to
surface about ongoing state failures in the regulation of coal
mining.9 The performances of two states that were granted primacy, Tennessee and Oklahoma, were so poor that OSM was
forced to take over their regulatory programs. 10 Congressional
committees overseeing OSM have been harshly critical of that
Agency, but their implied message often is that the states are
being allowed to get away with murder.1 And there continue to
be arguments that the federal government could regulate coal
mining more effectively or efficiently than the states. 2
But however poorly some states may be implementing
SMCRA, there are exceptions. Pennsylvania has a substantially
more effective coal mining regulatory program than it had in
1977. This Article provides a preliminary assessment"3 of how
well SMCRA has regulated active coal mining operations in the
State, and why. 14 Pennsylvania's implementation of SMCRA
8. See infra text accompanying notes 116-99. No other federal environmental statute
contains anything comparable to SMCRA's enforcement requirements.
9. See Galloway & Fitzgerald, Abuse of the Surface Mining Act: A Continuing Story,
87 W. VA. L. REV. 627 (1985); SURFACE MINING PROJECT, PuB. LANDS & ENERGY Div.,
NAT'L WILDLIFE FED'N, FAILED OVERSIGHT- A REPORT ON THE FAILURE OF THE OFFICE OF
SURFACE MINING TO ENFORCE THE FEDERAL SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION

ACT (1985) [hereinafter cited as

NAT'L WILDLIFE FED'N].

10. Squillace, supra note 4, at 700-02.
11. One oversight committee concluded that OSM has performed its oversight responsibilities so poorly that Congress should move OSM out of the Interior Department
to a more appropriate regulatory agency if OSM does not begin to show "demonstrable
improvement." HOUSE COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING: BEYOND
RECLAMATION?, H.R. REP. No. 206, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23 (1985) [hereinafter cited as
HOUSE COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS].
12. See Squillace, supra note 4.
13. The Article is preliminary because, among other reasons, the transition in the
field from the old regulatory program to the new program takes time, there is virtually
no "hard" data comparing the environmental effects of the old and new programs, the
latent environmental effects of coal mining often make comparisons of the effectiveness
of the old and new regulatory programs difficult, and the full meaning of certain SMCRA
provisions is only now being realized. Still, it is not too soon to begin to assess the major
trends that are developing.
14. The Article concentrates on the major elements of the regulatory program in order to maintain focus and a manageable length. The Article emphasizes surface mining
and to a somewhat lesser extent underground mining. Even though coal preparation
plants, coal refuse disposal piles, and related facilities fall within SMCRA's definition of
"surface coal mining operations," 30 U.S.C. § 1291(28) (1982), they are not discussed
here. The Article focuses primarily on bituminous rather than anthracite mining in large
part because 95% of the coal mined in Pennsylvania is bituminous (73.8 out of 77.7
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may or may not be representative of implementation by any
other state, but it serves as an important illustration of how
much a statute such as SMCRA can do to improve a state regulatory program. This is true even though the program's performance standards are in many ways parallel to those that existed in
1977, when Pennsylvania's coal program had a national reputation. During debate on SMCRA, Representative Morris Udall,
the House floor leader, explained that much of the bill was
modeled on the Pennsylvania program. "Pennsylvania has the
best law," he said. "[It does the best job.""6 While the substantive requirements of SMCRA may have been based on Pennsylvania law, SMCRA's implementation design was not. And it is
SMCRA's design features that have contributed the most to the
increased effectiveness of the Pennsylvania program.
Pennsylvania's program has improved for at least six reasons.18 First, and perhaps most significantly, the Department of
million tons in 1984).

PENNSYLVANIA DEP'T OF ENVTL. RESOURCES, ANNUAL

REPORT ON

19, 95 (1984) [hereinafter cited as MINING ACTIVITIES REPORT]. In addition, the Article does not discuss the abandoned mine land reclamation program created by title IV of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1231-1243 (1982). For a general overview of
Pennsylvania's surface mining laws, see Burcat & Geary, Surface Mining Regulation in
MINING ACTIVITIES

Pennsylvania, 57 TEMP.L.Q. 1 (1984).

Finally, the Article does not attempt comparison with other state programs under
SMCRA, nor does it try to assess the political factors that have affected Pennsylvania's
implementation of SMCRA. For an assessment of why states have had different degrees
of success in implementing a somewhat comparable federal statute, see Thompson &
Scicchitano, State Implementation Effort and FederalRegulatory Policy: The Case of
OccupationalSafety and Health, 47 J. POL. 686 (1985).

15. 123 CONG. REC. 12,872 (1977). Earlier, the following colloquy occurred between
Rep. Goodling of Pennsylvania and Rep. Udall:
"MR. GOODLING: Mr. Chairman, I would ask the gentleman, Does any State have a
better history of reclamation than the State of Pennsylvania?
MR. UDALL: No."
Id. at 12,869. Significantly, OSM's first director was Walter N. Heine, who had been an
associate deputy secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources.
16. The improvements in Pennsylvania's coal mining regulatory program have not
come easily. The requirements of remedial statutes such as SMCRA represent legal and
moral "oughts." The challenge of implementation, roughly speaking, is to transform
"ought" to "is"-to move the regulatory program from paper to the field. It is hard
enough simply to implement a law as written; an entire industry, its consultants, and its
employees must change their daily habits in numerous ways-mostly against their will.
State statutes and regulations must be amended, forms need to be prepared, and program guidance and procedures must be developed for the many issues that Congress and
the regulation writers never anticipated or believed too trivial for their attention. Additional staff have to be hired and trained. The regulatory agency must constantly and
firmly respond to questions such as "Do you really mean it?" and "What does this requirement actually mean in the field?" In some cases, tinkering with a federal requirement may be necessary to achieve its purpose, either through alternative provisions or
what might be described as "administrative engineering." Because the various parts of a
regulatory system are interdependent, moreover, a breakdown in one area may have adverse ramifications throughout the program.
The purpose of this Article, however, is not to relate war stories about Pennsylvania's
implementation of SMCRA. It nonetheless seems true, as the developing literature on
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Environmental Resources (DER), the State Agency charged with
administering the new program, is required to take structured
enforcement actions against all violations. Second, virtually all
aspects of DER's administration of the new program are explicitly open to scrutiny by persons outside DER, especially OSM
and the public. Third, the program is managed more professionally, in large measure because a three-fold increase in staffing
based on DER's annual grant from OSM has made individual
job responsibilities more manageable. Fourth, the new program
is set forth in writing rather than in oral tradition or bureaucratic folklore. It is also a program in which the written requirements are taken seriously or literally, rather than as mere guidance. Fifth, the new program requirements generally are based
on mechanical or measurable rules rather than on regulations
that depend largely on judgment or discretion. Sixth, DER decisions in the new program are based on more and better information, as well as information that is increasingly computerized
and therefore more accessible.
This Article also suggests that these design features are worth
considering for other comparable regulatory programs. These
features have made the Pennsylvania coal program more clearly
stated and understood, and have made the requirements of that
program more enforceable. They have significantly reduced the
distance that once existed between the written program and the
real program, and have helped ensure consistency and uniformity in DER's actions. They have improved the quality of DER
decisionmaking and have forced companies to provide better
quality data to justify proposed operations. And they have provided back-up systems to prevent and correct failures in program implementation. None of them necessarily depend on the
unique characteristics of coal mining or the State of Pennsylvania. They therefore provide a basis for understanding how other
environmental statutes can be made to work better.
This Article first explains the background against which
Pennsylvania's implementation of SMCRA has occurred. Coal
mining has had a serious and continuing effect on the State's
environment, as Part I explains. In response to these effects,
Pennsylvania began to regulate coal mining many decades ago.
implementation makes clear, that implementation is never easy. See generally J. PREssMAN & A. WILDAVSKY, supra note **; E. BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME (1977). For
that reason, what states do achieve under SMCRA should not be taken lightly.
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This regulatory development reached a milestone when the
State achieved primacy under SMCRA in 1982.
Part II suggests that the new program in Pennsylvania has
been responsible for substantial reductions in adverse environmental effects from surface coal mining, particularly less erosion
and sedimentation, less acid mine drainage, and more backfilling. In addition, Part II explains that coal operators have been
forced to change their planning and mining procedures because
of the new program, and that these changes have meant increased costs. At the same time, the primary factors affecting
coal production appear to be related to diminished demand for
coal.
The remainder of the Article assesses why the program has
improved, emphasizing those features of the federal scheme that
have contributed the most to the effectiveness of the new program and many of those that still need to be fully implemented.
Part III demonstrates that SMCRA has strengthened and enhanced a permitting process that was already fairly sophisticated when SMCRA was passed. Part III also explains that the
new program contains a clearer and more complete set of performance standards than the old program. Part IV demonstrates
that SMCRA has radically improved enforcement of the coal
regulatory program, generally by structuring the State's enforcement authority. In key ways this enforcement program is an innovative hybrid of SMCRA requirements and preexisting state
laws. An important feature of the new program, emphasized in
Parts III and IV, is increased opportunities for citizen participation.
Part V explains that SMCRA cost Pennsylvania its prior independence in program development but that program organization and the State's personnel complement have become
stronger and more sophisticated. Part V also argues that federal
oversight has made a major contribution to the increased effectiveness of the new Pennsylvania program. Finally, because
SMCRA allows states to implement more stringent and, to some
extent, different provisions, 17 Pennsylvania has been able to respond to the federal scheme in ways that enhance SMCRA's
protective features.
17. 30 U.S.C. § 1255 (1982); 30 C.F.R. §§ 730.5(b), 732.15(a) (1986); see also Sierra
Club v. Watt, 18 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1565 (D.D.C. 1982).

Cooperative Federalism
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I.

EVOLUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA'S REGULATORY PROGRAM

Pennsylvania's coal industry has contributed to the growth of
the nation's economy while causing environmental harm to the
State. This environmental damage prompted the development of
an increasingly effective regulatory program long before
SMCRA.
A.

Coal Mining in Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania coal played a major role in the development of
the national economy. Since Pennsylvania coal was first commercially mined in the nineteenth century, the State has produced about one-third of all the coal produced in the country."8
Although no longer the nation's leading coal producer, the State
ranked fourth among states in coal production in 1984 with almost 78 million tons.19 The long and productive history of Pennsylvania coal mining, however, means that 1984 production represents about one-half of one percent of all coal mined in the
State over the past century.2 0 Most of this earlier mining occurred without significant environmental controls.
The legacy of previous coal mining is visible almost everywhere in Pennsylvania's coal regions. The State has more than
175,000 acres of unreclaimed surface-mined land, and more than
2200 miles of streams polluted by acid mine drainage.2' About
150,000 acres in urban areas have the potential to subside because of previous underground mining.2 2 Ground water pollution
18.

PENNSYLVANIA

DEP'T OF

ENVTL.

RESOURCES,

PENNSYLVANIA'S

SURFACE

BOND FORFEITURE PROGRAM: THE PROBLEM AND RECLAMATION OPTIONS 1

ter cited as

BOND FORFEITURE PROGRAM].

before 1800. F. BINDER, COAL
19. KEYSTONE BITUMINOUS

MINING

(1985) [hereinaf-

Pennsylvania coal was used by blacksmiths

AGE EMPIRE 8 (1974).
COAL ASS'N, PENNSYLVANIA COAL DATA

1985, Tables 2 & 3

(1985) (calculated by adding bituminous and anthracite coal production) [hereinafter
cited as 1985 CoAL DATA]. The first three coal producing states were Kentucky
(165,458,000 tons), West Virginia (129,615,000 tons), and Wyoming (128,434,000 tons).
Id. at Table 3.
20. More than five billion tons of anthracite coal were produced in Pennsylvania between 1870 and 1984. MINING ACTIVITIES REPORT, supra note 14, at 18-19 (calculation
from table). Almost ten billion tons of bituminous coal were produced in the State between 1877 and 1984. Id. at 94-95 (calculation from table). Anthracite and bituminous
coal production in that period represents roughly 200 times the State's 1984 coal production. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
21. OFFICE OF RESOURCES MGMT., PENNSYLVANIA DEP'T OF ENvTL. RESOURCES, PENNSYLVANIA'S ABANDONED MINE RECLAMATION PLAN 2 (1983).
22. Id.
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from past surface and underground mining is a fact of life in
many areas, although its magnitude has never been calculated.
Many underground mine fires still burn, including a well-known
and especially costly fire at Centralia.2 s
This legacy is more than statistics to the people who live with
it. It represents strip-mined farmland that is now barren and
useless, homes that settled and cracked because the land subsided under them, and orange-colored lifeless streams that were
once swimming holes or trout fishing spots. Children have
drowned in water-filled pits from old surface mines, and hunters
sometimes accidentally fall from the highwalls or rock cliffs left
on unreclaimed land. People have died falling through old mine
shafts. Social and economic development is limited in many areas because potable drinking water is scarce or nonexistent.
Since the beginning of this century, Pennsylvania has attempted to mitigate the environmental harms caused by mining.
The State attempted to regulate subsidence as long ago as 1921
in a statute that the United States Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.2 4 In 1945, the
legislature passed one of the nation's first state surface mining
acts.2 5 The State's Clean Streams Law was repeatedly amended
over several decades beginning in 1945 to provide increasingly
stronger regulatory authority to prevent and control acid mine
drainage. 2' The surface mining statute was also repeatedly
amended, including a major revision that took effect in 1964 and
generally required that land be returned to approximate original
contour.2 7 Bituminous mine subsidence control legislation was
passed in different form in 1966, still long before any other state
23. The Centralia mine fire, named for the town under which it burns, has made
living there so dangerous that Congress appropriated $42. million to locate the residents
elsewhere. Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97 Stat. 1153,
1294-95 (1983). The fire has attracted national attention. See, e.g., Wash. Post, Mar. 29,
1984, at A19, col. 2.
24. 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (holding the Kohler Act, 1921 Pa. Laws 1198, unconstitutional under the fifth and fourteenth amendments as a taking of property without
compensation).
25. Bituminous Coal Open Pit Mining Conservation Act, 1945 Pa. Laws 1198. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld that Act in Dufour v. Maize, 358 Pa. 309, 56 A.2d
675 (1948).
26. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.1-.1001 (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1985). For a history
of the evolution of the law prior to 1980, see Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 455
Pa. 392, 395-400, 319 A.2d 871, 873-76 (1974).
27. 1963 Pa. Laws 238, 240-46 (amendments to Bituminous Coal Open Pit Mining
Conservation Act). The legislature strengthened the approximate original contour requirement and made it applicable to anthracite mining in 1971. 1971 Pa. Laws 554, 55865 (amending Act and renaming it as Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation
Act).
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had comparable legislation. 8 In two landmark decisions in Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co. in the 1970's, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that DER had statutory authority to
seek and obtain permanent treatment of a major discharge of
acid mine drainage. 9 It was to this body of law that Representative Udall referred when he said that Pennsylvania had the best
30
coal mining regulatory program in the country.
B.

SMCRA and the Road to Primacy

SMCRA represents the first federal effort to regulate comprehensively the environmental effects of coal mining on non-federally owned lands. Congress found that surface coal mining, while
contributing to national energy production, often caused erosion
and landslides, contributed to floods, polluted water, damaged
property, and created hazards to life and property.3 1 The first
stated purpose of SMCRA is to "establish a nationwide program
28. Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52,
1406.1-.21 (Purdon Supp. 1985). The court in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
Duncan, 771 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1456 (1986), upheld the
Act and implementing regulations against claims that they effected an unconstitutional
taking and impairment of contracts, and distinguished Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922).
29. Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 455 Pa. 392, 319 A.2d 871 (1974) (Barnes
& Tucker I); Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 472 Pa. 115, 371 A.2d 461 (Barnes
& Tucker H), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 807 (1977). The Commonwealth Court order
requiring treatment of the Barnes & Tucker discharge, which the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court affirmed in Barnes & Tucker II, is contained in Commonwealth v. Barnes &
Tucker Co., 23 Pa. Commw. 496, 513-14, 353 A.2d 471, 480-81 (1976) (paragraphs 1-2).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court plainly understood that treatment was likely to be
permanent because the Commonwealth Court had found:
There is no evidence of record by way of estimate or otherwise as to a foreseeable time at which Mine No. 15 will maintain itself at a static level without the
necessity of pumping and treatment of the pumped acid mine water discharge.
There is evidence that the degree of acidity of the discharge may slowly be reduced as the mine "cleans" itself.
Id. at 508, 353 A.2d at 478.
In a much earlier case, a coal operator appealed the denial of a permit, claiming that
the Sanitary Water Board, a predecessor Agency to DER, had no authority to require
permit applicants to show that no acid mine drainage will occur "for an indefinite period
after the mining operation has been completed." Sanitary Water Bd. v. Sunbeam Coal
Corp., 77 Dauph. 264, 273 (1961). The court rejected that claim, stating that the "need
for a clean, wholesome water supply continues indefinitely." 77 Dauph. at 273-74.
See also Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., 452 Pa. 77, 306 A.2d 308 (1973) (the
Clean Streams Law requires operators of an active underground mine to treat discharge
from an adjacent inactive mine that must be pumped to protect the active mine), appeal
dismissed, 415 U.S. 903 (1974).
30. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
31. 30 U.S.C. § 1201(b)-(c) (1982).

§§
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to protect society and the environment from the adverse effects
of surface coal mining operations."32
Despite the reference in its name to "surface" mining,
SMCRA establishes minimum environmental protection and
public safety requirements for all coal mining, both surface and
underground. 3 SMCRA requires a person who wants to begin
mining to file a permit application with the regulatory authority-in Pennsylvania, DER. The application must explain the
proposed mining method and demonstrate that the operation
will be conducted in an environmentally protective manner. If
DER approves the application, the operator must post a bond to
ensure that the site can be reclaimed if he fails to do so. The
mining operation must then be conducted according to an elaborate set of performance standards. Failure to conform to these
standards subjects the operator to orders and civil penalties,
and, when necessary, permit revocation or suspension, bond forfeiture, and criminal penalties. SMCRA also contains detailed
procedures for public participation, including a mechanism that
allows the public to request that areas be designated as unsuitable for surface coal mining."'
The regulatory program under SMCRA was implemented in
two phases. The interim program, which took effect in Pennsylvania in May 1978, was based on regulations covering key performance standards and certain enforcement procedures that
OSM had promulgated in December 1977. These federal regulations were binding on Pennsylvania's active coal operations in
32. Id. § 1202(a).
33. The most striking example of SMCRA's focus on overall environmental effects
from coal mining is its comprehensive approach to protection of water resources.
SMCRA prohibits the issuance of permits unless the permit application shows that the
proposed operation "has been designed to prevent material damage to [the] hydrologic
balance outside [the] permit area." 30 U.S.C. § 1260(b)(3) (1982). "The hydrologic balance is the equilibrium established between the ground and surface waters of an area
between the recharge and discharge of water to and from that system." H.R. REP. No.
218, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 109 (1977). This means that SMCRA regulates the operation of
underground mines even when surface effects are not evident.
This Article therefore uses the term "coal mining" to refer to all coal mining, "surface
mining" to refer to operations conducted by excavating overlying rock and recovering
coal, and "underground mining" to refer to operations in which coal is removed without
removal of the overlying rock. This terminology is used for clarity, and differs from the
definition of "surface coal mining operations" in SMCRA, which includes the surface
effects of underground mining. 30 U.S.C. § 1291(28) (1982).
34. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1256-1272 (1982). For an argument that the high level of detail in
SMCRA made OSM's initial implementation of the Act difficult, see Eichbaum & Babcock, A Question of Delegation: The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977 and State-Federal Relations. An Inquiry into the Success with Which Congress
May Provide Detailed Guidance for Executive Agency Action, 86 DICK. L. REV. 615
(1982).
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the same manner as the State's own regulations. 5 The second
phase began with OSM's March 1979 promulgation of permanent program regulations covering all requirements of SMCRA.
These permanent program regulations are the basis for longterm coal mining regulation under SMCRA and provide the basis for determining state program adequacy for primacy."
The Act gave states a choice about implementation of these
regulations. The states could either give up their regulatory programs and accept a program run by OSM, or they could demonstrate to OSM that they had the legal, financial, and administrative ability to run a regulatory program based on SMCRA and
the permanent program regulations. 37 If states chose the latter
route, their amended regulatory programs could be more stringent than federal law, but not less.3 8
In late 1977, a special meeting of environmentalists, coal operators, and representatives of DER unanimously concluded that
Pennsylvania should seek primacy. The decision was prompted
by many factors. SMCRA offered substantial financial incentives
in the form of federal grants to help administer a regulatory program as well as an abandoned mine land reclamation program-incentives that for the most part were available only if
the State sought and obtained primacy.3 9 The decision also grew
from the State's desire to have a role in the regulation of its own
coal industry. Because of its long history of regulating the coal
industry, DER believed it would be more sensitive to problems
and more effective than OSM, even with a new program. The
coal industry had worked with DER's regulatory staff and believed it could work better with them than with people it did not
know. State environmentalists believed that DER would run a
much better regulatory program under SMCRA. The decision
was also influenced by the State's pride in its regulatory program which, after all, was supposed to be the best in the
country.
After almost five years of negotiation, legislation, rulemaking,
and litigation about how DER should implement the new regula35. See 42 Fed. Reg. 62,639 (1977); 25 PA. CODE § 13.13 (1985).
36. See 44 Fed. Reg. 15,312 (1979).
37. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1253-1254 (1982).
38. Id. § 1255.
39. The Act authorizes OSM to award grants to states for the development of regulatory programs, and authorizes, increased grants to states that elect to seek primacy by an
amount that approximates the amount that OSM would have had to expend if the state
had not obtained primacy. 30 U.S.C. § 1295(a), (c) (1982). OSM may not "approve, fund,
or continue to fund" a state abandoned mine land reclamation program unless the state
has obtained primacy for its regulatory program. 30 U.S.C. § 1235(c) (1982).
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tory program, DER obtained primacy on July 30, 1982.40 The
new primacy program regulations went into effect the next
day.4 1 On paper, Pennsylvania had a new coal mining program.

II.

THE IMPACT OF THE NEW PROGRAM

The effectiveness of the new program 2 must be measured
against SMCRA's goals as well as the statutory and regulatory
means used to achieve those goals. The new program has had a
significant and environmentally beneficial effect on the way that
Pennsylvania coal operators conduct their business.
40. 47 Fed. Reg. 33,050, 33,097 (1982) (codified at 30 C.F.R. §§ 938.1-11 (1985)). In
Pennsylvania Coal Mining Ass'n v. Watt, 562 F. Supp. 741 (M.D. Pa. 1983), the court
upheld OSM's decision to grant primacy to Pennsylvania, except for a regulation concerning the timing of certain bond release decisions.
It took many months of meetings with an ad hoc advisory committee representing all
interests to hammer out the necessary changes to the statutes and regulations that DER
administered. On Oct. 10, 1980, the Governor signed into law amendments to five different statutes as part of the State's effort to obtain primacy. 1980 Pa. Laws 805 (amendments to The Administrative Code of 1929); 1980 Pa. Laws. 807 (amendments to Coal
Refuse Disposal Control Act); 1980 Pa. Laws 835 (amendments to Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act); 1980 Pa. Laws 874 (amendments to The Bituminous
Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act); 1980 Pa. Laws 894 (amendments to The
Clean Streams Law). A short time later, the necessary regulations were adopted. 10 Pa.
Admin. Bull. 4789 (Dec. 20, 1980).
Just as DER was about ready to submit a primacy application based on those statutes
and regulations, the coal industry obtained a one-year injunction that prevented DER
from doing so and also prevented DER from implementing the new regulatory program
on its own. See Pennsylvania Coal Mining Ass'n v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 498 Pa. 1, 2-3, 444 A.2d 637, 638 (1982). Plaintiffs alleged that pending constitutional and other challenges to certain portions of SMCRA rendered DER's entire proposed program suspect. SMCRA provides that the failure of a state to submit a primacy
application for up to one year "because the action is enjoined by the issuance of an
injunction by any court of competent jurisdiction" shall not result in the loss of eligibility for federal grants under SMCRA or the imposition of a federal program. 30 U.S.C.
§ 1253(d) (1982). The plaintiffs relied expressly on that provision in seeking their oneyear injunction. The United States Supreme Court later upheld the challenged SMCRA
provisions in two unanimous decisions. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981); Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
During the injunction period, and for several months afterward, the State amended
the primacy regulations for bituminous mining to somewhat simplify them. 12 Pa. Admin. Bull. 563 (Feb. 6, 1982) (proposed amendments); 12 Pa. Admin. Bull. 2473 (July 31,
1982) (final regulations).
41. 12 Pa. Admin. Bull. 2382 (July 31, 1982). The old program regulations were simultaneously repealed. Id.
42. The term "new program" refers to the current regulatory program. "Old program" refers to the program that existed in Pennsylvania before the interim OSM regulations took effect in 1978.
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A.

Impact on the Environment

Few if any studies have been conducted of the environmental
impact of the new program in Pennsylvania. Although SMCRA
is obviously an environmental protection statute, OSM's review
of the Pennsylvania program to date has been based almost entirely on compliance with various SMCRA requirements; there is
virtually no attempt to gauge the actual environmental effectiveness of the program.4 Making comparisons is also difficult because there is no readily available baseline data from which to
draw. For some problems, such as the potential for acid mine
drainage, it may be too early to say anything definitive because
acid often takes years to appear.
It is nonetheless possible to begin to draw conclusions about
the environmental effects of the new program, relying on observation and anecdote. Those who work in DER's field offices, the
operators, and many citizens have seen and continue to see that
the new program has thus far done a much better job of protecting the environment and people than the old program.
Perhaps the most dramatic changes have been those related to
erosion and sedimentation control at surface mines. Surface
mining is essentially an earth-moving activity. Huge masses of
rock and dirt are excavated, moved, stored, and replaced during
the life of an operation. When rain falls on this exposed rock
and dirt, it picks up particles that often find their way into
streams through surface runoff. Sediment from surface mining
operations can destroy the habitat for water-dwelling insects as
well as trout and other fish. Sediment also gives flowing water a
scouring quality that accelerates the erosion of stream banks
and bottoms. In the late 1970's, sediment from surface mining
operations in some watersheds threatened public water supplies
that relied on surface drainage in those watersheds. During that
period, virtually no surface mine in the State had erosion and
sedimentation controls. Now, almost all surface mines have such
controls, usually consisting of ditches to collect and channel surface runoff, and sedimentation ponds to hold runoff until sus43.

See

OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING,

1983

ANNUAL REPORT ON THE PENNSYLVANIA PER-

[hereinafter cited as 1983 OSM PENNSYLVANIA REPORT] (43 page report; no discussion of environmental effects); OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING, 1984 ANNUAL
REPORT ON THE PENNSYLVANIA PERMANENT PROGRAM [hereinafter cited as 1984 OSM
MANENT PROGRAM

PENNSYLVANIA REPORT] (112-page report; no discussion of environmental effects); OFFICE
OF SURFACE MINING, 1985 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE PENNSYLVANIA PERMANENT PROGRAM
[hereinafter cited as 1985 OSM PENNSYLVANIA REPORT] (129-page report; environmental

effects of two permits discussed on three pages: 107-09).
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pended particles have settled to the bottom. Stream quality improvements, particularly in those watersheds where public water
supplies were threatened, have been considerable.
There also appears to be a significant reduction in the number
and severity of acid mine drainage problems from active mining
operations. Acid mine drainage is a difficult problem for many
Appalachian coals, particularly those in Pennsylvania, Maryland, Ohio, Kentucky, and West Virginia." The high acid, iron,
and sulfate concentrations in acid mine drainage can kill virtually all life in streams and render water unfit for any human use.
A major part of Pennsylvania's historical regulatory effort has
been directed toward the prevention and control of acid mine
drainage-usually by denying permits that might cause it, and
by requiring treatment when it occurs. That effort appears to
have been more successful in recent years. Few acid mine drainage discharges are present in recently permitted surface mining
operations. A larger number of existing discharges are being
treated.
Water supplies are also receiving better protection from surface mining under the new program than they did under the old.
Coal mining can damage a water supply by dewatering or contaminating the aquifer on which it relies. This is particularly important in a highly populated state like Pennsylvania because
many people rely for their water supply on wells and springs
that are adjacent to surface coal mines. Largely because this
matter is more closely scrutinized in the permit review process,
the number of water supplies being lost or contaminated by surface mines without an adequate replacement supply has been reduced. The quality of replacement water supplies being provided
by surface miners has also improved.
Operators are backfilling surface mines more quickly than was
formerly the case, and therefore leaving less area unreclaimed at
any given time. Aerial flyovers of multiple surface mine sites in
Pennsylvania show much less unreclaimed area at active sites
than in the late 1970's. Concurrent backfilling, which is putting
rock and dirt back in the hole immediately after coal extraction,
reduces the exposure of rock materials to air and water, and
thus minimizes the potential for erosion or acid mine drainage.
Concurrent backfilling also makes the operator bear major reclamation costs as it conducts mining, rather than waiting to bear
those costs at the end of the operation when abandonment of
44. See
(1969).

APPALACHIAN

REGIONAL

COMM'N,

ACID MINE DRAINAGE
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APPALACHIA
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the site may be a major temptation. In addition, concurrent
backfilling reduces the amount of reclamation necessary if the
operator fails to comply with its legal obligations.
The quality of revegetation at reclaimed surface mining sites
also appears to have improved considerably under the new program. Revegetation and replacement of topsoil make it more
likely that a site will be useful after mining, and useful for multiple purposes. These practices also reduce erosion from reclaimed sites. The quality, density, and permanence of vegetation are much greater than in the late 1970's. The topsoil
applied to these sites also appears to bear a closer resemblance
to the original soil, and contains less rocky material than it did a
few years ago.
This is not to suggest that coal mining is no longer causing
any environmental problems in Pennsylvania. As long as operators violate the laws, some environmental degradation will continue. Some degradation, moreover, is not prevented by
SMCRA. Although DER has found a way to protect public water
supplies from underground mining, private water supplies are
45
not directly shielded from the effects of underground mining.
Many subsidence impacts are still allowed."6 The program does
not directly address noise, vibrations, and increased truck traffic
from coal mining activity. Still, Pennsylvania's new program has
significantly reduced the environmental impacts of coal mining.
B.

Impact on the Coal Industry

Pennsylvania's coal industry is comprised of a large number of
fairly small surface miners and a smaller number of larger underground miners.' 7 In all, there are more than 3000 active oper45. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
46. The new program affords much greater protection against subsidence damage
than the old program. Compare 25 PA. CODE § 89.143 (1985) with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52,
§ 1406.4 (Purdon Supp. 1985) (§ 4 of the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act). Certain structures and features nonetheless remain unprotected. These
include, for example, nonpublic buildings not customarily used by the public that were
erected after Apr. 27, 1966, the date on which the Subsidence Act originally took effect.
See 25 PA. CODE § 89.143(b)(1)(ii) (1985).
47. About three-fourths of Pennsylvania's licensed surface mining operators are considered small operators under SMCRA because they produce less than 100,000 tons per
year. Interview with J. Anthony Ercole, Executive Vice President of the Pennsylvania
Coal Mining Ass'n (Jan. 27, 1986) [hereinafter cited as Ercole interview]; see also 30
U.S.C. § 1257(c) (1982) (operators producing less than 100,000 tons per year are eligible
for financial assistance in preparing part of the permit application concerning probable
hydrologic consequences of mining). Only three licensed surface mining operators pro-
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ations, s yet the industry does not consider itself to be healthy.
The new program has significantly changed the way in which
most coal operators conduct their business. These changes have
increased costs, but they are responsible for the diminished environmental impact of mining under the new program. Although
the expense of complying with environmental regulations is not
insignificant, the industry's primary problem appears to be lower
demand for Pennsylvania coal.
The new program has significantly affected mining and reclamation practices for most coal operators, as well as the way in
which operators plan their operations. Most of the larger companies now have a management level person responsible for environmental affairs. These employees, who usually have a college
degree in a field such as engineering or geology, evaluate properties for potential lease or purchase based on the environmental
effects of mining that property and the likelihood of obtaining a
permit, as well as the size and quality of the coal reserve.4 e They
are also responsible for overseeing the preparation of permit applications, and for compliance with the new program requirements during the life of the operation. Most of the smaller operators rely on environmental consultants to an unprecedented
degree, and are more concerned than they were under the old
program about the potential for obtaining a permit when they
acquire coal properties. The new enforcement program has
forced all operators to pay more attention to compliance with
the law to avoid penalties and, ultimately, to avoid being shut
down.
While these results are environmentally beneficial, they have
also had some adverse economic impact on the industry. Sorting
out the impact of different factors is difficult because one pressure makes other pressures harder to bear. The most important
duced more than one million tons in 1984, and none of these produced more than two
million tons. MINING AcTivrTiEs REPORT, supra note 14, at 100. On the other hand, the
deep mining industry tends to be comprised of larger operators; 11 produced more than
one million tons in 1984, and five produced more than two million tons. Id. at 99. Many
of these companies are affiliated with steel companies, oil companies, or electric utilities,
and use modern production methods and sophisticated management to extract millions
of tons annually from newly opened mines. The larger surface and underground operators rely on long-term contracts, while the smaller companies, which cannot obtain such
contracts, tend to rely on the spot market for sale of their coal.
48. 1985 OSM PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 43, at 8, 38. OSM counted 3820
"inspectable units" under SMCRA in 1984-1985, 738 of which were not active. Id. at 38.
49. For an analysis of environmental issues related to the purchase or leasing of coal
properties, see McGinley & Webber, Pandorain the Coal Fields:Environmental Liabilities, Acquisitions, and Dispositions of Coal Properties,87 W. VA. L. REV. 665 (1985).

SUMMER 1986]

Cooperative Federalism

factors affecting Pennsylvania coal production nonetheless appear to be related to the coal market. 50
Although current production is comparable to coal production
in the early 1970's, 5' the future of Pennsylvania coal appeared
much brighter immediately after the 1973 Arab oil embargo. A
large scale transition by utilities from oil and gas to coal was
expected, and coal was widely endorsed as a reliable domestic
fuel. The market price of Pennsylvania coal more than doubled
between 1973 and 1975, from $10.30 per ton to $25.09 per ton.5"
Annual production increased by almost eleven million tons as
many new operators got into the business. 53 Many of these operators were small and undercapitalized, and had little or no experience in the coal business.
Unfortunately, the coal boom was short-lived. Supply soon exceeded demand, which meant that the rapid increase in coal
prices did not continue. Interest rates rose sharply in the late
1970's, making it more costly to borrow money for mining equipment, the cost of which was also rising. The global recession that
began in the late 1970's contributed to the decline in demand,
particularly as it contributed to the decline in steelmaking and
related industries in Pennsylvania and elsewhere. Coal production in Western States as well as many foreign countries also
increased considerably, providing stiffer competition for Pennsylvania coal and reducing the potential for coal exports. Because much Pennsylvania coal has a relatively high sulfur content, many utilities purchased lower sulfur coal from other
Appalachian States.5 4 All of this contributed to the failure of
many undercapitalized operators in the State through the late
1970's and early 1980's, particularly operators who lacked long55
term contracts for the coal they produced.
The economic effect of the new program must be understood
against that background. Operators must submit much more detailed permit applications under the new program than under
50. See C. Harris, The Effects of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977 on the Pennsylvania Surface Mining Industry 93 (Dec. 1983) (Pennsylvania State
University, master's thesis); Ercole interview, supra note 47.
51. Pennsylvania produced about 83.1 million tons of coal in 1973, compared to 77.7
million tons in 1984. MINING ACTIVITIES REPORT, supra note 14, at 19, 95. Pennsylvania
coal production is in a state of gradual and long-term decline. Coal production in the
State peaked in 1917 and 1918, when more than 250 million tons were produced each
year-more than three times the production in 1984. Id. at 18, 94.
52. 1985 COAL DATA, supra note 19, at Table 6.
53. Production increased from 83.1 million tons in 1973 to 94.0 million tons in 1979.
MINING ACTIVITIEs REPORT, supra note 14, at 19, 95.
54. C. Harris, supra note 50, at 55-75; Pitt. Press, July 7, 1985, at Al, col. 1.
55. BOND FORFEITURE PROGRAM, supra note 18, at 1-2.
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the old program, which increases the cost of preparing them as
well as the time DER needs to review them.5 6 Many operators
are particularly unhappy with the increased review time, claiming that it makes financial planning and management of new operations more difficult and costly. The enforcement provisions of
the new program require operators to pay more attention to
compliance than was previously the case, which also increases
costs.6 7 These costs are very real to the people who bear them,
but they would be easier to bear if the coal market were better.58
And to the extent that the new program has forced increased
costs on the industry to protect the environment, coal producers
have absorbed costs that the public once bore.

III.

PERMITTING AND PERFORMANCE STANDARDS

The new program has not changed the basic legal obligations
of Pennsylvania coal operators as much as it has changed the
manner in which those obligations are imposed. This Part explains some of the major requirements of the new program,
while the next Part explains how DER enforces them.
A.

Permit Application Process

Pennsylvania law prohibited coal operators from mining without a permit long before SMCRA was adopted, 5 and provided
for the denial of permits if operators could not meet certain cri56.

See infra Part III.

57. See infra Part IV.
58. Harris concluded that there was little evidence that the new program has had any
significant impact on small operators, even though one might expect that they would be
most hurt by the new SMCRA requirements. "Most coal industry insiders agree that
market conditions, instead of over-regulation, has [sic] been the cause for a decrease in
the number of surface producers, especially the small operations that started in 1973 and
1974." C. Harris, supra note 50, at 85.
The industry and its employees are nonetheless in a painful period. Coal industry employment in Pennsylvania climbed from 30,775 in 1973 to 40,361 in 1979, but then
dropped to 25,916 in 1984. MINING ACTIVITIxs REPORT, supra note 14, at 19, 95.
59. Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52,
§ 1396.4(a) (Purdon 1966); Clean Streams Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.307(a),
.315(a) (Purdon Supp. 1985); 25 PA. CODE § 99.26 (repealed, 12 Pa. Admin. Bull. 2382
(July 31, 1982)); see also Commonwealth ex rel. Chidsey v. Black, 363 Pa. 231, 69 A.2d
376 (1949) (injunction affirmed against surface coal mining operation that was conducted
without State approval, even in the absence of evidence that the mine was causing
pollution).
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teria. These provisions are substantially unchanged in the new
program.6 0
The permit review process is nonetheless more thorough
under the new program. As a result, DER is making better decisions about whether to issue permits. One measure of that is the
denial rate for permits. In 1978, for example, DER issued 339
new surface mining permits and denied only six." In 1985, by
contrast, DER issued 268 and denied thirty new surface mining
permit applications. 2 Even this does not tell the complete story,
for DER's increasing rigor in scrutinizing permit applications
has prompted many operators to withdraw permits prior to a
formal denial, and to not apply for other permits. In other cases,
DER is issuing permits but mandating additional environmental
protection measures that were not previously required. Although
the new process does not protect against all environmental impacts, and although the optimal scope of that process remains to
be defined, the new permit application process does a better job
of preventing and limiting environmental damage from mining.
Perhaps the most important technical obstacle to permit issuance in Pennsylvania is the potential of a site to cause acid mine
drainage. The potential of a site to produce acid is based on the
way in which the rock and coal on the site will react chemically
when exposed to air and water; this potential is difficult to
change through design of the mining or reclamation plan. Other
permit application requirements, such as a postmining vegetation plan, can be designed for any site, and thus do not usually
represent a serious obstacle to permit issuance.6 3 Preventing acid
mine drainage in the permit application process is particularly
important because a site that generates acid is likely to keep doing so for hundreds or thousands of years, and because the only
solution in most cases is permanent treatment of the acidic
water running off the site. Although DER can require permanent
60. 25 PA. CODE § 86.11(a) (1985) (prohibiting mining without a permit). Although
SMCRA exempts surface mining operations that affect two acres or less, 30 U.S.C.
§ 1278(2) (1982), this exemption is not contained in the Pennsylvania program. The twoacre exemption has caused significant problems in other states. See Galloway & Fitzgerald, supra note 9, at 628-34; NAT'L WILDLIFE FED'N, supra note 9, at 24-31.
61. Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Resources, Bureau of Mining and Reclamation,
computer printout from Federal Activity Report Data Base (Jan. 23, 1986) (copy on file
with U. MIcH. J.L. REF.).
62. Id.
63. This section therefore focuses on that part of the permit application process that
concerns water resource impacts of coal mining. There are, of course, other potential
obstacles to permit issuance. These include the applicant's compliance with the mining
laws at other sites. See infra Part IV(C).
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treatment,8 ' it is inappropriate to allow predictable acid mine
drainage to occur. Establishing, maintaining, and monitoring a
treatment system that may be needed for thousands of years is a
daunting but necessary prospect for unexpected problems; it is
unnecessary for expected problems because they can be prevented through permit denial.
The obligation of permit applicants to demonstrate that there
is no potential for acid mine drainage was therefore a major feature of Pennsylvania law prior to SMCRA. The State regulation
creating that obligation put the burden of proof on the permit
applicant and required permit denial even if there was only a
potential for acid mine drainage.6 5 In Harman Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, Department of Environmental Resources,6 the
court applied that regulation to sustain DER's denial of a permit
even though the applicant had conducted more studies than
were usually required at the time. The court ruled that DER
had properly concluded that the operator's studies were insufficient to show the lack of acid mine drainage potential. The language of that regulation is reproduced verbatim in the new pro67
gram regulations.
Protection of water supplies from surface mining is another
important feature of the prior Pennsylvania program that remains substantially unchanged in the new program. Shortly
before SMCRA was adopted, the Pennsylvania legislature
amended the surface mining law to require surface coal miners
to replace public and private water supplies that they had polluted or dried up.6 8 The Environmental Hearing Board (EHB),
which hears appeals of final DER actions, has construed this
amendment as requiring permit denial when an applicant who is
likely to affect adversely a water supply cannot demonstrate the
availability of a replacement supply. 9 This amendment and decision are consistent with the requirements of the new federal
program.7 0 Protection of private water supplies from under64. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
65. 25 PA. CODE 99.35(a) (repealed, 12 Pa. Admin. Bull. 2352 (July 31, 1982)).
66. 34 Pa. Commw. 610, 384 A.2d 289 (1978).
67. 25 PA. CODE § 86.37(a)(3) (1985); cf. 30 U.S.C. § 1260(b)(3) (1982) (requiring permit denial unless applicant demonstrates that proposed operation "has been designed to
prevent material damage to hydrologic balance outside permit area").
68. 1977 Pa. Laws 99 (codified in the Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation
Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1396.4b(f) (Purdon Supp. 1985)).
69. Cambria Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 1983 EHB 23.
70. Compare 25 PA. CODE §§ 87.47, 87.119 (1985) (Pennsylvania water supply protection for bituminous surface mining) with 30 U.S.C. §§ 1258(a)(13)(C), 1307(b) (1982) and
30 C.F.R. § 816.41(h) (1986) (federal water supply protection provisions).
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ground coal mining, however, is not part of the SMCRA or
Pennsylvania programs.'
The new program improves DER's ability to make technically
sound decisions under these provisions because it increases the
information required of a permit applicant to show that it is entitled to a permit, and expands the scope of the hydrologic impact determination needed prior to permit approval. SMCRA requires each permit application to include a "determination of
the probable hydrologic consequences of the mining and reclamation operations, both on and off the mine site," so that the
regulatory authority can assess the probable cumulative hydrologic impacts of mining in the area.7 2 SMCRA prohibits the issuance of permits unless the assessment of probable cumulative
hydrologic impacts has been made and "the proposed operation
has been designed to prevent material damage to [the] hydrologic balance outside [the] permit area. '7 3 The Pennsylvania
program in 1977 had no counterpart to the requirement that
permit applications describe probable hydrologic impacts. The
prohibition against permit issuance for operations not designed
to prevent offsite hydrologic impacts, moreover, expands the
regulatory language used in Harman. These requirements are
contained in the new Pennsylvania program.74
Perhaps the best way of measuring the information required
in the old and new permit applications is to compare the applications themselves. The required information for the hydrogeology of the site is the information most critical to determining
whether the site has the potential to cause acid mine drainage.
The new permit application requires a detailed geologic descrip71. A federal court has twice held, on review of OSM's regulations, that SMCRA does
not protect public or private water supplies from underground mining. See In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 19 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1477, 1495 (D.D.C.
1980); In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig. II, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
2153, 2163 (D.D.C. 1985).
The Pennsylvania program is more stringent than SMCRA on this issue because it
protects public water supplies from underground mining. A preexisting Pennsylvania
statute prohibits public nuisances, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 510-17 (Purdon Supp. 1985),
a term that surely includes the loss of a public water supply. Because it is arbitrary and
capricious for DER to issue a permit that would lead to a public nuisance, Glasgow
Quarry, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 1974 EHB 308, DER cannot issue an underground coal mining permit that would cause the loss of a public water supply. The new Pennsylvania program does not, however, contain any direct protection for
private water supplies from underground mining.
72. 30 U.S.C. § 1257(b)(11) (1982).
73. Id. § 1260(b)(3).
74. See 25 PA. CODE §§ 86.37(a)(4), 87.69, 88.49, 89.36, 90.35 (1985). Section
86.37(a)(4) requires the prevention of adverse hydrologic effects both on and off the permit area.
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tion and analysis of the site based on core borings and other
information. It requires a description of all aquifers on or immediately under the coal to be mined, as well as an analysis of the
rate and direction of groundwater movement. All public and private water supplies within 1000 feet of the permit boundary
must be described in detail. The application must include monitoring results from those water supplies as well as from streams,
springs, wetlands, and other water sources within 1000 feet of
the permit area. Finally, the applicant is required to submit an
overburden analysis-a geochemical evaluation of the potential
of the site to cause acid mine drainage-unless it demonstrates
75
to DER that such information is available in another form.
The old permit application, by contrast, asked for a more general description of the geology of the proposed permit area. The
application asked operators to show how acid water that might
collect in the pit would be treated, but did not inquire about
aquifers. The application, as modified in September 1976, also
asked for certain information about nearby public and private
water supplies, but did not require that those water supplies be
sampled. Nor did the application require monitoring of nearby
streams and other water sources. Overburden analysis was required on occasion, but not routinely.7 6 The old form, in short,
did not require the sophisticated analysis of the potential hydrologic impacts of the proposed operation that is presently required. Although it was true that DER permit review staff could
always ask for more information in individual cases," the new
permit application ensures that more information is obtained in
all cases.
Under the old and new programs, a permit applicant must
publish notice of the proposed permit in a local newspaper once
a week for four consecutive weeks.7 But the new program con75. See Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Resources, Application for Surface Mining Permit Pursuant to "The Clean Streams Law," the "Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act," and the "Coal Refuse Disposal Control Act"; see also 25 PA. CODE §§
87.43-.46 (1985) (comparable application requirements for bituminous surface mining).
76. See Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Resources, Application for Permit Approving
Discharge of Industrial Wastes and Mine Drainage Pursuant to "The Clean Streams
Law" (Form ER-MR-25, rev. 1976).
77. See Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52,
§ 1396.4(a)(2)(L) (Purdon Supp. 1985).
78. The old program made a distinction between mine drainage permits and mining
permits for surface mining. Publication was required for mine drainage permits, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.307(b) (Purdon Supp. 1985), which represented the large areas
on which an operator could mine once it had posted a bond. Obtaining a mine drainage
permit required an operator to demonstrate, among other things, that the proposed operation did not have the potential to cause acid mine drainage. Although an operator could
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tains additional opportunities for citizens to participate in the
permit review process. Interested persons may file written comments or request a public hearing. If a hearing is requested
within thirty days of the last newspaper notice, DER must hold
a hearing. The permit application must now be available for
public review in a regional DER office; under the old program,
permit applications could be reviewed by the public only at
DER's central office in Harrisburg.7 9 Most of the permit file is
now considered public information; more information could be
withheld under the old program. 80 Finally, DER provides direct
written notice to persons when a surface mining permit application shows that the permit, if issued, is likely to affect adversely
their water supply. This notice, which surprisingly is not required by SMCRA or OSM's regulations, gives persons an opportunity to influence the permit process, the quality of their
replacement supply, or both. 81 Although it has taken time for
the public to realize what these changes mean, more and more
persons are asking to review proposed permit applications, are
not mine unless it also had a mining permit, a mining permit represented merely a part
of the mine drainage permit for which the operator had posted a bond. Newspaper notice
is now also required for what was once called the mining permit. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52,
§ 1396.4(b) (Purdon Supp. 1985). Under the new program, the old mine drainage permit
is known as the mining permit, and the old mining permit is known as the bonding
increment.
79.

See 25 PA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 86.31(b), 86.32, 86.34 (1985).

80. See

PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 52, § 1396.4(a)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1985); 25

PA. CODE

§

86.35 (1985); cf. Right to Know Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 66.1-.4 (Purdon Supp.
1985). Although the new mining provisions do not repeal the Right to Know Law, they
supersede that law insofar as that law applies to mining because they are more specific
and more recently enacted than the Right to Know Law. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 1933,
1936 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
81. One of the central premises of SMCRA is the desirability of public participation
in the regulatory process. See, e.g., H.R. R"i. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 88-89 (1977)
("While citizen participation is not, and cannot be, a substitute for governmental authority, citizen involvement in all phases of the regulatory scheme will help insure that the
decisions and actions of the regulatory authority are grounded upon complete and full
information."). Neither SMCRA nor its regulations provide for direct notice to persons
that a permit application shows that their water supply may be adversely affected by the
proposed operation, however. This omission is especially remarkable because the obligation to demonstrate the availability of an alternate water supply means that those persons who may be affected will almost certainly be identified in the permit application.
Although state and federal law do not appear generally to prohibit operators from affecting water supplies, they do prohibit the issuance of permits that would adversely affect
water supplies when the applicant has not demonstrated the availability of a replacement supply. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text. In January 1985, primarily
as a matter of fairness, DER began providing direct notice to persons whose water supply might be affected by a proposed operation.
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making more technically sophisticated comments about these
applications, and are requesting public hearings. 2
Although the permit application process is more effectively
protecting the environment, at least two implementation issues
remain. First, in response to OSM, DER has begun to address
the problem of determining the probable cumulative hydrologic
impacts of a mining operation in the permit review process.
OSM believes that DER has not adequately defined the cumulative impact area to be addressed in the permit review process
and does not adequately review certain cumulative hydrologic
impacts.8 3 These issues will be difficult to resolve. It is hard
enough to assess the hydrologic impacts of an individual mining
operation; the available predictive tools, including overburden
analysis and evaluation of impacts from other adjacent mines,
are not perfect. It is even more difficult to measure and assess
the cumulative impacts of multiple mining operations. DER has
not yet developed a standard methodology for defining the cumulative hydrologic impact area or for assessing cumulative surface and groundwater quantity and quality effects of multiple
operations. Nor does it appear that anyone, including OSM, has
yet developed a standard methodology for realistically doing so.
These technical issues are complicated by a recent court ruling
that remanded a key element of OSM's cumulative hydrologic
balance assessment regulations. 4
Second, it is becoming increasingly apparent that studies are
necessary to compare the water quality impacts of the new permits with those of the old permits. Although there is a widespread belief that the new permit review process is more protective of water quality,8 5 that belief has not been tested in
empirical studies. Such studies are particularly important because the predictive tools used for acid mine drainage require
refinement, and because the effectiveness of certain environmen82. DER also provides written notice of permit applications to the Pennsylvania Fish
Commission, Pennsylvania Game Commission, Pennsylvania Historic and Museum Commission, the city, borough, incorporated town or township in which the site would be
located, water companies that may be affected by the proposed operation, and other
agencies. 25 PA. CODE § 86.31(c) (1985). These agencies frequently improve DER's permitting decisions with their useful comments.
83. 1985 OSM PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 43, at 21-23.
84. The court remanded the OSM regulation prescribing when the "life of the mine"
hydrologic analysis should occur. The court held that OSM had not provided a reasoned

explanation for requiring that analysis to be conducted as part of the cumulative hydrologic impact analysis by the regulatory authority rather than as part of the assessment of
probable hydrologic consequences by the operator. In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig. II, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2153, 2159-62 (D.D.C. 1985).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 68-82.

SUMMER

19861

Cooperative Federalism

tal protection measures required in many new permits is not
fully understood.8 Empirical analysis will also be important as
DER initiates a novel permitting program for areas with preexisting acid mine drainage discharges.8 7 The data derived from
such studies could be of great benefit in future permitting
decisions.
B. Areas Off Limits to Mining
The idea that certain areas are unsuitable for surface coal
mining is not new to Pennsylvania. A permitting process that
prohibits mining of areas with a potential for acid mine drainage
will necessarily render certain parts of the State unsuitable for
mining. More broadly, the State's long-standing water quality
regulations have effectively prohibited or limited mining on certain sensitive watersheds.8 8 And since 1972, Pennsylvania has
generally prohibited surface mining within 300 feet of an occupied dwelling without the consent of the owner, within 100 feet
of a stream or a road, and within certain distances of other features."9 SMCRA borrowed and somewhat expanded these buffer
zone provisions. As modified, they are part of the Pennsylvania
program. 0
SMCRA also added a provision to Pennsylvania law for which
there was no effective precedent in the State-a formal designation process to identify and set aside from future mining certain
86. Although DER hydrogeologists generally believe that overburden analysis greatly
assists in making permit decisions, they do not believe that it is a completely accurate
predictive tool. The chemical reactions used in overburden analysis often oversimplify
field conditions in a way that impairs their effectiveness as a predictive tool. In addition,
DER cannot readily field check all information provided by the operator, meaning that
the quality of DER's decision may depend on the quality of the data gathered by the
operator. When DER does issue permits, moreover, it often requires operators to add
alkaline material to the site and to handle acid and toxic forming materials in special
ways. Empirical studies of the accuracy of overburden analysis as a predictive tool, and
of the effectiveness of alkaline addition and special handling as permit conditions, would
be particularly useful.
87. See 15 Pa. Admin. Bull. 2377 (June 29, 1985). These regulations were approved
by OSM on February 19, 1986, 51 Fed. Reg. 5997 (1986), and went into effect on March
8, 1986. 16 Pa. Admin. Bull. 673.
88. See 25 PA. CODE §§ 93.3, 93.7(e), 93.9 (1985) (designation of high quality and
exceptional value streams and establishment of specific water quality criteria for these
streams).

89. Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act,

§§

PA. STAT. ANN. tit.

52,

1396.4b(c), 1396.4e(i) (Purdon Supp. 1985).
90. Compare 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (1982) (federal buffer zone requirements) with PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1396.4e(e) (Purdon Supp. 1985) (Pennsylvania buffer zone requirements).
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areas with special resources. 9' The process is triggered by petition from an interested citizen, which makes it one of the most
far-reaching public participation features in the new program;
areas that are designated unsuitable generally cannot be mined.
A petition is in many ways the opposite of a permit application.
The petition must contain sufficient allegations and supporting
evidence to warrant a ten-month technical study by DER to investigate the merits of the petition. If DER decides to conduct a
technical study, it prepares a report and holds a hearing at the
conclusion of the ten-month study period. If designation of the
area is warranted, DER makes a recommendation to the Environmental Quality Board, DER's rulemaking authority. Designations are accomplished by rulemaking, which gives them greater
visibility, durability, and credibility.
Congress intended that the designation process would be used
for larger areas than would be included in a permit application,
and also intended that the process would be used in long-range
planning for the protection of special resources. 92 Pennsylvania
has used the process in that manner.
The State had designated six areas as unsuitable for mining in
early 1986, in each case to protect a public water supply. Six
more petitions were under consideration in early 1986.9 3 All but
91. 25 PA. CODE §§ 86.121-.129 (1985); see also Surface Mining Conservation and
Reclamation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1396.4e(a)-(d) (Purdon Supp. 1985); Clean
Streams Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.315(h)-(m) (Purdon Supp. 1985). These provisions are based on 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)-(d) (1982).
For years prior to primacy, DER and its predecessor agencies unofficially designated
areas as unsuitable for mining. Although these designations were made by policy rather
than by statute or regulation, they were often very effective. In Doraville Enters. v.
Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 1975 EHB 390, the EHB observed that DER
and its predecessor agencies had refused to issue permits in one watershed for more than
twenty years. In this case the EHB brought the policy to an end by holding that DER
could not simply deny permits proposed for "conservation areas," as they were called. In
the absence of express statutory or regulatory authority, the EHB held that DER was
required to consider permit applications on their merits. Id. at 398. The new Pennsylvania program provides that authority.
Under the new program, designations are applicable to all coal operators except those
with "substantial legal and financial commitments." 25 PA. CODE § 86.121(b) (1985).
That term means:
significant investments that have been made prior to January 4, 1977, on the
basis of a long-term contract in power plants, railroads, mineral-handling, preparation, extraction or storage facilities, and other capital-intensive activities.
Costs of acquiring the mineral in place or of the right to mine it without an
existing mine are not sufficient commitments, standing alone, to constitute substantial legal and financial commitments.
Id. § 86.101.
92. See H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 94-95 (1977).
93. See 25 PA. ConE § 86.130 (1985). For more information on the areas that have
been designated as unsuitable for mining, see 13 Pa. Admin. Bull. 2968 (Oct. 1, 1983)
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one of the areas under consideration were watersheds, or large
sections of watersheds, that provide surface drainage for a public
water supply in the State's mountainous regions. Protection of
public water supplies is particularly important in those parts of
the State's coal bearing regions where most, if not all, of the
available water supplies have been polluted by previous mining.
Protection of public water supplies is not the only basis for designations, however. In Pennsylvania, the designation process has
focused on watersheds that contain high quality streams with
little buffering capacity against potential acid discharges. These
streams are generally high quality fisheries for brook and brown
trout. The watersheds usually also have a history of DER permit
denials based on the potential of sites to cause acid mine
drainage.
The designation process has affected the way that Pennsylvania's citizens and coal operators regard coal mining. The primary
effect of the process has been the assurance that it provides to
public water suppliers and their customers that water supplies
subject to designations will be protected. Designations also assure fisherman, hunters, and others who use designated areas
that resources there will be protected. In addition, designations
aid coal operators' planning by telling the operators that permit
applications for designated areas would almost certainly be
denied.
Finally, the designation process has important symbolic value.
It means that certain areas should not be mined. The process is
therefore directed against the view long held in Pennsylvania
and elsewhere that coal should be mined wherever it can be
found. In that respect, the process may be the most basic symbol
of the new regulatory program, for it means that environmental
values prevail when coal mining and environmental protection
4
cannot be reconciled.
(Griffithtown); 14 Pa. Admin. Bull. 446 (Feb. 11, 1984) (upper Cold Stream watershed);
14 Pa. Admin. Bull. 2670 (July 21, 1984) (Black Bear Run watershed); 14 Pa. Admin.
Bull. 2667 (July 21, 1984) (portion of Mill Run watershed); 16 Pa. Admin. Bull. 1274
(Apr. 12, 1986) (upper Powell Run watershed). A sixth area was approved for final
rulemaking on November 19, 1985. For more information about this area-the Byrnes
Run watershed-see 15 Pa. Admin. Bull. 1829 (May 18, 1985) (notice of proposed
rulemaking).
Areas that have been proposed for designation include the Rogues Harbor Run watershed and the Little Muddy Run watershed. Several other areas are under study by DER.
1985 OSM PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 43, at 91. DER has rejected six of the 17
petitions it has received. Id.
94. A person who believes that a designation is no longer warranted may file a petition to terminate the designation, however. 25 PA. CODE § 86.123(d) (1985). This petition,
which must contain allegations of newly discovered facts with newly discovered support-
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C. Performance Standards
Performance standards are the operating rules with which operators must comply to run a lawful operation. Pennsylvania had
a fairly sophisticated set of performance standards when
SMCRA was passed in 1977. In fact, many federal requirements
were derived from basic concepts in long-standing Pennsylvania
law. The federal act and regulations, however, put many of these
standards in writing, made many others more enforceable, and
forced the State to protect against certain adverse effects it had
not previously addressed.
In many ways, the performance standards under the new program are conceptually the same as those in the old program. For
example, both programs require surface operators to backfill an
area after mining, require that a mine site be reclaimed to approximate original contour, require revegetation of the site, prohibit discharges from the mine site that exceed certain effluent
limitations, and prohibit certain blasting practices. 5
ing evidence not contained in the record of the designation proceeding, is otherwise subject to the same requirements and procedures as a petition to designate an area. Cf. id.
§ 86.123(c) (requirements for petition to designate an area).
95. Compare 25 PA. CODE § 77.92(f)(1)-(2) (repealed, 12 Pa. Admin. Bull. 2382 (July
31, 1982)) (backfilling) with id. § 87.141 (1985) (backfilling); Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1396.4(a)(2)(G) (of 1972 Act) (approximate original contour) with id. § 1396.4(a)(2)(E) (approximate original contour); 25
PA. CODE §§ 77.1-.72 (repealed, 12 Pa. Admin. Bull. 2382 (July 31, 1982)) (revegetation)
with 25 PA. CODE §§ 87.147-.156 (1985) (revegetation); id. § 77.92(c) (repealed, 12 Pa.
Admin. Bull. 2382 (July 31, 1982)) (effluent limitations) and 40 C.F.R. pt. 434 (1978)
(effluent limitations under Federal Clean Water Act for point source discharges from
coal mines) with 25 PA. CODE § 87.102 (1985) (effluent limitations) and 40 C.F.R. pt. 434
(1985) (current effluent limitations under Federal Clean Water Act for point source discharges from coal mines); 25 PA. CODE chs. 210, 211 (1985) (blasting restrictions) with id.
§§ 87.124-.129 (additional blasting restrictions).
In some cases, however, the general similarity disguises real differences on important
details. Approximate original contour under the new program, for example, is defined as
regrading the surface so that it resembles the general surface configuration of the land
prior to mining, and blends into and complements the drainage pattern of the surrounding terrain, with all highwalls and spoil piles eliminated. Surface Mining Conservation
and Reclamation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1396.3 (Purdon Supp. 1985). Under the
old program, however, approximate original contour was basically defined in terms of a
slope from the highwall to the base of the spoil bank at an angle that was not to exceed
the approximate slope prior to mining. 1971 Pa. Laws 554, § 3 (Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act prior to amendment in 1980). This meant that an operator
could substantially change the area where it had mined and still be consistent with State
law. Areas reclaimed under the previous definition were flatter and less conducive to
good drainage, meaning that precipitation was more likely to soak into such sites, come
into contact with acid forming materials, and manifest itself as acid mine drainage at the
base of old spoils. The definition in the new program avoids many of the problems associated with the prior definition.
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The performance standards in the new regulatory program
differ from those in the old program partly because the new
standards are incorporated into the regulations. These new regulations allow more uniform application and enforcement of performance standards. They also give coal operators and the public a clear idea of what is required. Many of the new regulations
set forth requirements that were once unwritten. The performance standards in the new regulations are also longer and more
detailed than those in the old regulations. If they are not applicable to all situations, they contain variance provisions.9 Others
incorporate a long laundry list of "standard conditions" and another list of "special conditions" that DER permit review staff
developed over time to supplement the brief and inadequate old
program regulations. DER imposed selected conditions in issuing permits, and these were binding on an operator in the same
manner as regulations. There was little written guidance on
which permit conditions should be imposed under what situations, even though many of the program's most important requirements were imposed only through permit conditions. An
old program regulation that was interpreted by permit review
staff to allow permit conditions to supersede regulations contributed to an unevenly administered set of performance
standards. 7
The performance standards in the new program are also written in a more enforceable manner than those that were written
in the old program. The best performance standards have four
qualities.9 First, they have as few elements as possible, and as
few exceptions and potential affirmative defenses as possible.
Second, each element is based on a mechanical or measurable
rule rather than a judgment rule. Both of these characteristics
greatly simplify compliance determinations, which is particularly
important to a regulatory agency that must deal with many
thousands of actual and potential violations annually. Performance standards based on these two characteristics give coal operators a clearer idea of what is expected of them and reduce the
likelihood of different or inconsistent interpretations. Third, the
96. Compare 25 PA. CODE §§ 86.91-.181 (1985) (new program performance standards
for bituminous surface mining) with id. §§ 77.2-.72, 77.92 (repealed, 12 Pa. Admin. Bull.
2382 (July 31, 1982)) (old program performance standards) and id. §§ 99.31-.37 (repealed, 12 Pa. Admin. Bull. 2382 (July 31, 1982)) (additional old program performance
standards). Although the old program requirements for revegetation were very detailed,
id. §§ 77.2-.72, the other old program requirements were not.
97. See id. § 77.92(a) (repealed, 12 Pa. Admin. Bull. 2382 (July 31, 1982)).
98. This analysis is adapted from Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative
Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983).
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mechanical rules in the best performance standards are good
surrogates for the environmental protection that is sought. No
regulatory agency wants to spend time and energy pursuing
technical violations that are unrelated to environmental protection. Fourth, the mechanical rules must fit the activity they are
intended to regulate so closely that their application in every
case will yield an appropriate and fair result. Such rules must
sometimes provide for their refinement or alteration through
permit conditions to ensure that they fit individual cases. This is
particularly important in a system based on mandatory enforcement responses, because an unworkable performance standard
damages the credibility and effectiveness of that system. Although the performance standards in the new program are not
perfect, they meet these characteristics much better than those
in the old program.
The backfilling regulations are an example of this difference.
Under Pennsylvania's new regulatory program, backfilling must
follow coal removal by no more than sixty days. When the operator can demonstrate that more time is needed, DER may establish an alternative time period, say eighty days, as a condition in
the operator's permit. 9 This regulation, which was adopted directly from OSM's original regulations, relies on a simple
mechanical rule and a variance provision that allows a different
simple mechanical rule to be imposed where necessary. The rule
is a mechanical way of expressing the concept of concurrent
backfilling, and is thus a good surrogate for the environmental
protection being sought. There is relatively little room to argue
about compliance with such a rule. Under the old regulatory
program, by contrast, backfilling was required to "be accomplished as mining progresses in accordance with the mining
plan." 10 This much broader rule was subject to widely varying
interpretation in the field and provided more room for argument
between DER and operators. It is easier for operators to comply
with a rule that is clearly defined, and easier for DER to enforce
such a rule.
In many other areas, the new program contains performance
standards requiring DER and operators to address environmental and public safety issues they had not previously addressed.
The new program, for example, requires operators to provide
99. 25 PA. CODE § 87.141(c)(1) (1985). In late 1983, OSM repealed the federal regulation on which that provision was based. A court subsequently remanded OSM's decision.
See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
100. Id. § 77.92(f)(1) (repealed, 12 Pa. Admin. Bull. 2382 (July 31, 1982)).
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public notification of planned blasting activity and to conduct
pre-blast surveys. 10 ' These regulations did not exist in the old
program. The new regulations require operators to identify postmining land uses for areas they mine, and establishes special
performance standards for certain kinds of post-mining land
uses. The old regulations merely required identification of the
postmining land use. 0'° The new regulations require operators to
conduct extensive surface and groundwater monitoring in and
around mining sites; 03 there were no such requirements in the
old program. The new regulations require operators to mitigate
damage to wetlands, to avoid damage to endangered or
threatened species, and to mine and reclaim areas with prime
farmland according to a more protective set of performance
standards than are applicable to other lands.10 4 None of these
requirements existed in the prior program.
Perhaps the most important and difficult of the new performance standards are those related to protection of the hydrologic
balance from the adverse effects of coal mining.105 These performance standards differ from the hydrologic balance informational requirements that must be satisfied to obtain a permit because these standards are applicable to active mining operations.
DER's new program regulations for underground mining require
that mining be conducted to "minimize" changes to the hydrologic balance on and off the permit area; the surface mining regulations require that disturbances to the hydrologic balance be
"prevented."' 0 6 Both surface and underground operators, moreover, are required to restore the recharge capacity of aquifers
they affect. 0 7 The new program is forcing DER as well as Pennsylvania coal operators to think more broadly about hydrologic
impacts, but the scope of these provisions remains to be defined.
Underground mining offers a good example of the difficulties
involved in applying these regulations, partly because the new
program addresses a broad range of previously uncontrolled hy101. Id. § 87.125 (1985).
102. Compare id. §§ 87.75, 87.150, 87.151(d), 87.159 with 1971 Pa. Laws 554, §
4(a)(2)(B), repealed by 1980 Pa. Laws 835 (amendments to Surface Mining Conservation
and Reclamation Act).
103. See 25 PA. CODE §§ 87.116-.117 (1985).
104. See id. § 87.101(b) (requiring that changes in depth to groundwater be minimized); id. § 87.138 (requiring protection of fish, wildlife, and related environmental values); id. §§ 87.177-.181 (requiring protection of prime farmland).
105. See 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(10) (1982).
106. See 25 PA. CODE § 89.52(a) (1985) (hydrologic balance protection for underground bituminous mines); id.§ 87.101(a) (hydrologic balance protection for surface bituminous mines).
107. Clean Streams Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.315(d) (Purdon Supp. 1985).
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drologic impacts. Underground coal mining creates vast passageways in which groundwater accumulates and often turns to acid.
This acidic groundwater can migrate offsite, polluting aquifers
even if it does not manifest itself in a surface discharge. Active
underground coal mining can also dewater aquifers or lower
water tables, destroying water supplies and making areas less
suitable for future use. The old program addressed these impacts only to a limited extent. Because prevention of direct discharges of acid mine drainage into streams was considered both
desirable and possible, a primary goal of the old regulatory program was to ensure that no postmining discharges into streams
resulted from underground mine development. Underground
coal mines were sealed after operations were completed to keep
acidic water in the old mine workings from becoming a surface
discharge into a stream. Little attention was given to the impact
of underground mining on groundwater quality or the integrity
of aquifers and many water supplies. Another primary goal of
the old underground mining program was to protect certain
property from subsidence. Little time was devoted to subsidence
impacts on surface or groundwater."'8
As important as the new hydrologic balance protection requirements are, however, they are not defined in a manner that
makes enforcement easy. These requirements are comparable to
the backfilling regulation in the old Pennsylvania program; they
require that adverse impacts to the hydrologic balance be prevented or minimized, but they do not define that with any precision. Congress recognized that the total prevention of hydrologic
impacts from mining is impossible, yet these impacts are substantial and often permanent. Congress also anticipated that
state regulatory authorities such as DER would require
"whatever additional measures are necessary to meet local conditions.' ' 109 What effects must be minimized, and how much, are
questions that remain to be answered. DER is wrestling with the
108. DER's claim in Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 455 Pa. 392, 319 A.2d
871 (1974), for example, was not that coal mining had polluted the groundwater, but
rather that the polluted water was discharging into a stream. See supra note 29. If the
company had managed to keep the polluted water sealed up in the underground mine
workings, the case would not have occurred. Unfortunately, a breakout sent millions of
gallons of acidic water into a stream every day until the company began treatment. Similarly, the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act of 1966 was directed
toward the protection of houses, cemeteries, and similar features from the impacts of
subsidence. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.4 (Purdon Supp. 1985). Until the new program,
protecting the hydrologic balance from the impacts of subsidence caused by underground
mining was not required.
109. H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., IstSess. 110 (1977).
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question of whether the hydrologic balance regulations help protect private water supplies from underground mining,'1 0 given
that SMCRA apparently affords no direct protection to those
supplies. Mitigation measures for potential damage to streams,
ponds, aquifers, and other features are still being worked out on
a case-by-case basis. OSM's 1983 promulgation of a regulation
requiring that offsite hydrologic damage from surface and underground mining be prevented rather than merely minimized
raises still more questions."' What the new hydrologic balance
protection requirements will ultimately mean is thus still
uncertain.
IV.

ENFORCEMENT

The most dramatic changes SMCRA has made in Pennsylvania's program are related to enforcement. SMCRA contains
highly detailed enforcement provisions that required substantial
changes in Pennsylvania's enforcement program. The new enforcement system requires specified responses to defined categories of violations, rather than allowing almost complete discretion in responding to any violation. Its increased effectiveness
can be measured by the evolution in cited violations in the past
several years. In the late 1970's and early 1980's, most of the
violations represented major problems, such as failure by an operator to reclaim thousands of acres, mining without a permit,
and no effort to control erosion. Now, most of the violations are
less significant-some nonconcurrent backfilling, minor off-permit mining, or failure to maintain adequately erosion and sedimentation controls. The number of major problems has significantly declined.
By affirmatively requiring the regulatory agency to respond in
specified ways to different kinds of violations, SMCRA repre110. The loss of private water supplies can be attributed to pollution of, or damage
to, an aquifer-that is, an adverse effect on the hydrologic balance. Coal operators are
now required to minimize damage to the hydrologic balance in both the permit and adjacent areas. 25 PA. CODE § 89.52(a) (1985). The Clean Streams Law provides for the promulgation of regulations to protect public and private water supplies. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
35, § 691.501 (Purdon Supp. 1985). These provisions, among others, appear to provide a
basis in state law for promulgating regulations to protect private water supplies from
underground coal mining.
111. See 30 C.F.R. §§ 816.41(a), 817.41(a) (1985); see also 48 Fed. Reg. 43,956,
43,976-77 (1983) (explaining the change, albeit cryptically). A bill under consideration in
the Pennsylvania legislature would protect private water supplies from underground
mining. H.B. 848, 169th Sess. (Pa. 1985).
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sents a significant challenge to the traditional view that government enforcement officials should enjoy substantial discretion in
12
the cases they prosecute and in the remedies they seek.'
SMCRA's enforcement provisions can be justified on several
grounds, however. First, a mandatory enforcement system" s is
the only way to ensure that the categorical substantive requirements of a statute or regulation are actually applied to all persons within the category. This is a particularly important response to concerns that the strict requirements of many laws are
often undermined by agencies that do not enforce them. " 4 Second, a mandatory enforcement system tends to be fairer to regulated parties because it helps ensure that similar violations are
treated similarly. It therefore overcomes a frequent tendency by
regulatory agencies to take enforcement action against smaller
companies with little political clout rather than larger or politically well-connected companies. A mandatory enforcement system also helps companies to protect themselves because it reinforces adherence to the written program rather than unwritten
and frequently changing exceptions or variances that may lull
them into a false sense of security about their compliance with
the program.
Third, a mandatory enforcement system ensures that the
agency reacts promptly and effectively to violations. Such a system can be highly useful to a regulatory agency because it re112. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969), represents the classic statement on behalf of limiting enforcement discretion by administrative agencies.
113. This term refers to an enforcement system that requires an agency to conduct
frequent inspections and requires the agency to take affirmative enforcement action to
correct and/or punish all violations. Although it means that many enforcement actions
are not discretionary, it does not mean the complete absence of enforcement discretion.
The agency may still have flexibility, for example, in choosing among enforcement options or in resolving interpretive questions over the meaning of particular performance
standards. Pennsylvania's coal mining enforcement program contains such flexibility.
114. See Heckler v. Chaney, 105 S. Ct. 1649, 1660-68 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring).
In response to public concerns about insufficient enforcement and enforcement resources, Congress has included "citizen suit" provisions in most environmental statutes
that generally allow lawsuits to be filed against the regulatory agency for failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty, and against regulated parties that violate the law. See,
e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1982) (SMCRA citizen suit provision); see also S. REP. No. 128,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1977) ("[C]itizen suits can play an important role in assuring
that regulatory agencies and surface operators comply with the requirements of the Act
and approved regulatory programs. The possibility of a citizen suit should help to keep
program administrators 'on their toes.' "). See generally Hays, ENVIRONMENTAL LrrIGATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 969, 972 & n.11 (1986). Supplementary citizen enforcement, however, is no substitute for a mandatory enforcement system because individuals and citizen groups lack the time and resources of a properly
staffed regulatory agency.
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stricts the range of issues about which a company violating the
law could otherwise bargain, including whether formal enforcement action is appropriate, how long the agency should wait
before taking formal action, and the length of time allowed to
correct violations. Without such limitations, correction of violations can take years instead of weeks or perhaps months. As
cases or potential cases drag on, the agency's sense of urgency
about them often declines and enforcement personnel may
change, contributing to further delays. When an agency tolerates
more than a marginal level of noncompliance, moreover, companies frequently raise equitable defenses in enforcement actions,
claiming, among other things, detrimental reliance on actual or
implied representations by government officials that particular
requirements would not be enforced. Such defenses make litigation more difficult and time-consuming for the agency even
15
though they usually are not successful.'
A regulatory program that categorically requires specified enforcement responses to different kinds of violations, of course,
requires considerable resources and personnel. It also requires
considerable foresight and planning on the part of program
managers and regulation writers to ensure that the system runs
smoothly and fairly. To ensure that the program is properly
staffed, for example, the litigation load must be predicted with
some degree of accuracy. But a mandatory enforcement system
and the increased staffing that accompanied it are the most important reasons for the increased effectiveness of the Pennsylvania coal program.
Ironically, SMCRA's enforcement system was the element of
the primacy program that DER resisted most strongly. Some
DER staff responsible for program development were concerned
that the system would bureaucratize enforcement with burdensome paperwork and procedural requirements, interfering with
the substantial discretion that they believed was responsible for
the effectiveness of the old program. Some also believed that the
nondiscretionary nature of the federal enforcement system
would severely burden DER enforcement personnel as well as
the EHB. These problems exist in the new program, but they
See Heckler v. Community Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984):
When the Government is unable to enforce the law because the conduct of its
agents has given rise to an estoppel, the interest of the citizenry as a whole in
obedience to the rule of law is undermined. It is for this reason that it is well
settled that the Government may not be estopped on the same terms as any
other litigant.
(citations omitted).
115.
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have been outweighed, for the most part, by the positive features of the new program. The new system has worked as well as
it has because it combines and enhances the best elements of the
old State program with elements of the federal program, creating a better enforcement system than either was by itself.
A.

Inspection Frequency

Perhaps SMCRA's most far-reaching enforcement provision is
the requirement that state regulatory authorities conduct twelve
inspections of each operation per year. Under the Act, one inspection per calendar quarter must be "complete"; the inspector
must examine the entire site for compliance with all applicable
performance standards. At least eight other "partial" inspections
each year are required; the inspector must examine the site for
compliance with certain performance standards."'6 These requirements are part of Pennsylvania's new program.
The State has made significant progress in meeting these requirements. In 1984-1985, DER conducted 34,326 inspections on
about 3800 operations, representing eighty-eight percent of the
required complete inspections and eighty-five percent of the required partial inspections. 1 7 DER conducted about 10,000 more
inspections than it had in the previous year." 8 Near the peak of
the coal boom in 1978, by contrast, DER conducted 9292 inspections.1 19 Inspectors under the old program might visit the same
site only two or three times per year. Sometimes, entire sites
were mined without an inspection.
Increased inspection frequency has had a substantial effect on
the willingness of operators to comply with the law. Put bluntly,
they know that violations are more likely to be caught, and
therefore they make greater efforts to stay in compliance. Increased inspection frequency also helps ensure that violations
are identified at an earlier and more easily correctable stage.
The nature and appearance of an active surface mine changes
116.

117.

30 U.S.C. § 1267(c) (1982).

1985 OSM PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 43, at 36, 38. The years 1984-1985
represent OSM's reporting period for its annual report on the Pennsylvania program:
July 1, 1984 to June 30, 1985. All similar references in this Article are to a comparable
12-month period. The percentage figures for 1984-1985 compare to 47% of all required
inspections in 1982-1983, 1983 OSM PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 43, at 17, and
65 % of all required complete inspections and 60 % of all partial inspections in 1983-1984.
1984 OSM PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 43, at 35.
118. 1985 OSM PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 43, at 38.
119. Interoffice memorandum from George Rieger to Keith Gentzler (undated) [hereinafter cited as Rieger memorandum] (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.).
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almost daily; some areas are being opened, some are being
mined, and some should be under reclamation. Monthly inspections mean that operators are less likely to get behind in backfilling, for example. They are also less likely to stray past the
boundaries of their permits.
The quality of inspections has also improved because inspectors know the sites better when they visit them. Inspectors are
more familiar with the nature of the operation and with existing
and potential problems. Site familiarity has also improved because each inspector is assigned to inspect fewer operations; this
was an inevitable result of increasing inspection frequency per
site. Because inspectors are required to take water samples during complete inspections, the quality of DER's information
about the effect of individual operations on surface and groundwater quality has increased.
Although Pennsylvania has done much to fulfill SMCRA's enforcement requirements, OSM's Pennsylvania field office believes that more must be done. DER has not quite reached the
required number of complete and partial inspections. Because a
complete inspection is supposed to cover all applicable performance standards and include water sampling, OSM has also gathered data on the completeness of these inspections. According to
OSM, DER needs to make more diligent efforts to ensure that
complete inspections are actually complete. 2 ' Many DER personnel, on the other hand, are unhappy about conducting inspections at certain sites, such as essentially reclaimed sites that
are simply awaiting bond release. Increased inspection frequency, however, has had a substantial positive effect on program enforcement.
B.

Mandatory Identification of Violations

Another of SMCRA's significant features is its requirement
that inspectors identify all violations in writing. That requirement has been incorporated into the Pennsylvania program.1 2 '
As a result, the number of violations identified in writing has
increased dramatically under the new program. About 7000 violations were identified in writing in 1984-1985, compared to less

§

120. See 1985 OSM PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 43, at 39-41.
121. Compare 30 U.S.C. § 1267(e) (1982) (federal provision) with 25 PA. CODE
86.214 (1985) (Pennsylvania provision).
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than 1000 in 1977.12 Because certain enforcement actions are
supposed to follow automatically written identification of violations, this requirement plays an important role in the new enforcement program.
To make maximum use of the inspection frequency and violation identification requirements, DER redesigned the form that
inspectors must complete when they visit a site. Among other
things, the new inspection form123 contains a checklist of all applicable performance standards, identified by section number
from the regulations as well as by subject matter. The inspector
must check which performance standards were inspected for and
mark all violations. The inspector must explain his or her findings in a narrative section. The old report form1 24 contained no
checklist; there was no way to know for sure what the inspector
looked for unless something was written in the narrative. For the
three general questions that the old form specifically asked inspectors, there were three possible answers: yes, no, and noted.
The third category was a standard way of acknowledging that
there was a violation without really saying so. The new inspection forms have no third category.
The new Pennsylvania program also contains provisions for
citizen involvement in the inspection process. When a citizen
gives DER reason to believe that there is a violation at a site,
DER must conduct an inspection and provide the citizen an opportunity to accompany the inspector on the site. DER must
also provide a written response to the citizen within thirty days
after the complaint, whether or not an inspection is conducted. 125 These provisions in the new program underscore the
requirement that all violations be identified.
Mandatory identification of violations symbolizes how much
the inspector's job has changed under the new regulatory program. In the old program, inspectors had substantial discretion.
There were fewer and more general performance standards, and
little guidance from DER about when to cite violations, when to
122. See 1985 OSM PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 43, at 50; Mine Drainage Control & Reclamation & Licensing and Bonding Div., Bureau of Surface Mine Reclamation,
Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 1977 Annual Report. According to the 1977 report, 967 violations were cited at both coal and noncoal mining operations. The actual
number of citations for coal mining operations would thus be less than 967. Most of the
difference between 1984-1985 and 1977 is due to the old program's practice of citing only
the most significant violations.
123. Copy of new inspection form on file with U. MICH.J.L. REP.
124. Copy of old report form on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.
125. See 25 PA. CODE § 86.215 (1985) (requiring a written response "as soon as
practicable").
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issue orders, or when to refer a case for civil penalties or other
legal action. To a large extent, the inspector himself was the law
in his inspection district. Inspectors attempted to secure compliance through the management of their relationships with operators rather than through extensive reliance on legal procedures.1 2 In practice, for example, this often meant that an
inspector would not write backfilling violations in his inspection
reports if the operator claimed that backfilling would drive the
operator out of business or that backfilling would begin next
week. While the system achieved a great deal of reclamation
when operators acted in good faith or had a good working relationship with their inspectors, all too often operations simply got
out of hand.
Inspectors did not identify some violations largely because
there were not enough inspectors. In the late 1970's, twenty to
thirty DER inspectors were responsible for more than 3000 permitted surface mining operations. 2 7 In one county, a single inspector was responsible for more than 600 sites. 28 Writing violations and taking enforcement action required time that could be
devoted to other sites, and inspectors were reluctant to do that
except for the very worst cases.
The new system represents a substantial improvement in several ways. First, and perhaps most basically, it depersonalizes
the enforcement process to a significant degree. The personal
qualities of the inspector, of course, are still important in ensuring that the process works smoothly. But the existence of a
structured enforcement process means that DER's enforcement
responses are more likely to be appropriate for the violations
that DER finds. Second, identification of all violations, whether
large or small, helps ensure that violations are corrected at an
early stage. This means better environmental protection, more
solvable problems for the operator, and more manageable enforcement litigation for DER. Third, identification creates a record of previous violations, which can be extremely useful in taking enforcement action. In the past, enforcement against
persistent violators was sometimes hampered by a poor contem126. See generally K. HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT (1984). Hawkins
studied water pollution control inspectors in England and Wales, and provides a useful
and comprehensive evaluation of how inspectors are forced to operate in a regulatory
system with virtually no formal enforcement authority. His assessment in many ways
parallels how Pennsylvania surface mining inspectors operated before primacy, and to a
lesser extent after primacy.
127. Ercole interview, supra note 47.
128. Id.
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poraneous written record of violations. Finally, identifying violations provides feedback for the permit review staff within DER,
who can learn how well particular environmental protection
measures required in the permit have worked.
The citizen participation aspect of this program appears to be
working, even though some problems remain to be resolved. In
one recent year, DER received 706 citizen complaints about potential violations and, according to OSM, responded adequately
to virtually all of them. 129 Interestingly, OSM found DER's initial action to be appropriate in almost every case, which may be
a good measure of how DER is responding to the new system. 130
OSM has also found, however, that DER does not always provide citizens an opportunity to accompany inspectors on the
mine site. The defensiveness of certain DER personnel toward
this aspect of the program has begun to diminish as DER gains
131
more experience with it.
Notwithstanding the significant increase in cited violations in
recent years, OSM believes that DER still does not cite all violations during its inspections. Using a controversial statistical
analysis of DER and OSM inspections in Pennsylvania, OSM
has stated that it would have cited three times as many violations as DER in 1984-1985.12 OSM has also asked DER to describe more adequately violations that are identified, although
OSM believes that DER has made significant improvement in
documenting violations in recent years. 13 3 Given DER's current
progress on these matters, it is not unreasonable to expect that
they can be resolved.
Many DER personnel, on the other hand, are frustrated with
the paperwork associated with identifying and documenting all
violations as well as the mandatory enforcement procedures at129. 1984 OSM PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 43, at 43-44; see also 1985 OSM
PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 43, at 44.
130. 1984 OSM PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 43, at 43. More recently, OSM
noted that DER had made significant improvements in applying these provisions in a
uniform manner. 1985 OSM PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 43, at 44.
131. In 1983-1984, DER notified citizens who complained of a violation that they had
the right to accompany the inspector on the ensuing violation in 17 of 38 cases sampled
by OSM. 1984 OSM PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 43, at 44. In 1984-1985, DER
notified citizens of their right to accompany the inspector in 34 of 56 cases sampled by
OSM. 1985 OSM PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 43, at 45. Many DER personnel have
expressed concern about their personal liability should a citizen be injured while accompanying them on a mine site, and this may explain why the numbers are not higher.
132. 1985 OSM PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 43, at 55. See generally id. at 5257. In an appendix to the report, DER objected to OSM's statistical methodology. Id. at
app. 2-4.
133. Id. at 41-43.
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tendant to their identification. They see time spent doing
paperwork as time they do not spend on environmental protection. Such problems are not trivial. But the new requirement for
identification of all violations has improved the effectiveness of
the Pennsylvania regulatory program.
C. Permit or License Denial Based on Violations
A long-standing and unique feature of Pennsylvania law is the
requirement that each surface coal operator annually obtain
from DER a license, which is a kind of occupational license un13 4
related to the permit necessary to mine a specific site.
SMCRA contains no comparable requirement. Under the old
regulatory program, DER could not legally issue or renew a license to an operator that had failed and continued to fail to
comply with the surface mining laws. The prohibition was also
applicable to an operator if any of its officers or directors had
failed and continued to fail to comply with the laws. 13 5 Application of this prohibition to officers and directors was necessary to
prevent persons from limiting their legal responsibilities through
a multitude of different but closely related companies. The prohibition against license issuance under these circumstances affected an operator's ability to stay in business. It also meant
that violations at one site could not be ignored by an operator
that mined on many sites.
This prohibition concerning the issuance of licenses also has
long been applicable in Pennsylvania to permits. 136 This provision is intended to prevent an operator from expanding its business by obtaining new permits when it is violating the law on its
existing permit sites.
DER's ability to deny licenses and permits based on uncorrected violations, or withhold licenses and permits until violations were corrected, was-and still is-widely regarded as one
of the Agency's most important enforcement tools prior to primacy. DER's authority to use this tool under the new program is
greater in some ways and less in others. But the system for
134. Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52,
1396.3a(a) (Purdon 1966 & Supp. 1985). No license is required for underground
mining.
135. Id. § 1396.3a(b).
136. Clean Streams Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.609 (Purdon 1966), amended by
1980 Pa. Laws 894 (current version at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.609 (Purdon Supp.
1985)).

§
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tracking and managing violations has improved considerably,
thereby improving DER's ability to determine when licenses and
permits should be denied.
DER's legal authority in the new program differs from that in
the old program in several respects. First, SMCRA requires permit denial based on a history of past violations that shows a lack
of intent or ability to comply with the law, even if there are no
current violations. 37 Second, the new program generally expands the number of related parties-partners, officers, parent
corporations, subsidiary corporations, and affiliates-for whose
13 a
violations DER must deny permits and licenses to operators.
Third, the new program requires DER to deny permits based on
39
violations found by OSM as well as violations in other states.
Fourth, under a 1984 Pennsylvania legislative amendment that
limited the scope of DER's licensing authority, DER must deny
licenses for violations of consent orders, cessation orders, and
court orders, but can no longer deny or withhold licenses for
continuing violations of statutes, regulations, or administrative
140
orders.
Perhaps the most significant changes under primacy, however,
are in DER's tracking system for violations. Historically, DER
has kept a "violation docket" at its central office that consisted
of looseleaf notebooks organized alphabetically by operator
name, and less comprehensive dockets in the district offices.
DER checked the violation docket just prior to permit or license
issuance; before a permit or license could be issued, the operator, its officers, and owners had to clear any violations from the
docket. The system frequently worked well, but it was not foolproof. Information was organized by operator name and wellknown relationships with other operators. As a result, it was frequently difficult to make sure that operators did not get licenses
or permits if their relationships to noncomplying operators were
not well known. In addition, there was some uncertainty about
what kind of violation should prompt the withholding of a license or permit. For these and other reasons, the docket was not
as effective as it might have been.
137. 30 U.S.C. § 1260(c) (1982). This requirement is incorporated in the Pennsylvania
program at 25 PA. CODE § 86.37(a)(10) (1985).
138. Compare, e.g., 1980 Pa. Laws 835, § 3.1(b) (amendments to Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act) with 1972 Pa. Laws 1662, § 3.1(b) (amendments to Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act).
139. 25 PA. CODE § 86.37(a)(11) (1985).
140. 1984 Pa. Laws 916 (amending § 3.1 of the Surface Mining Conservation and
Reclamation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1396.3a (Purdon 1966)).
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DER has now initiated a systematic computer tracking system
for inspections, violations, enforcement actions, permitting, and
related matters. As this system gets underway, DER will be better able to deny permits to noncomplying operators as well as
their "related parties" because the computer program has the
ability to identify and display the interrelationships between operators and their owners and managers. Although DER depends
on coal operators to report accurately company ownership and
control information, the computer program will enable more
thorough analysis of the information that it is provided. In addition, the computer system will allow DER to deny permits based
on OSM violations or violations in other states, once OSM establishes a computerized data base and program for these violations. DER simply does not have the resources to identify these
4
violations without assistance from OSM.' 1
Apart from the transition to a computerized tracking system,
DER has clarified its policy concerning what violations should
hold up permits. DER will deny or withhold a permit from an
operator based on violations that have led to the issuance of an
order. These violations are those of greatest environmental significance.1 42 As a result, there is a greater institutional willingness to deny permits to operators based on uncorrected violations. 143 This system is in direct response to the proliferation of
reported violations that occurred early in the new program. Although many of these violations were significant, many were of
minor significance and were quickly corrected. It proved impractical and administratively impossible to withhold permits or licenses based on minor violations as long as they were corrected
within the required time.
D.

Mandatory Correction of Violations Within Ninety Days

SMCRA requires that states take specified enforcement actions in response to violations, and requires all violations to be
abated within ninety days. Although Pennsylvania has incorporated those requirements into its program, it has done so in a
141.

OSM has not yet established an effective computer system to help manage its
COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, supra
note 11, at 19-21.
142. See infra Part IV(D).
143. The computerized system will also help DER to track efficiently operators' violation histories, enabling DER to implement the new provision allowing permit denial
based on past violations.

large number of civil penalty collection cases. HousE
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manner that preserves features of its previous program that are
superior to the federal program. The resulting combination is
better than either the old Pennsylvania program or SMCRA's
requirements.
SMCRA requires states to order immediately the cessation of
any condition, practice, or violation that creates an "imminent
danger to the health or safety of the public." 4' 4 States also must
immediately issue a cessation order when there is a condition,
practice, or violation that is "causing, or can reasonably be expected to cause significant, imminent environmental harm to
land, air, or water resources.' 145 The order must remain in effect
for the duration of the problem leading to the order. In addition,
the state must impose affirmative obligations requiring the operator to abate the imminent danger or significant environmental
harm.1 46 For all other violations, the state must fix "a reasonable
time but not more than ninety days for the abatement of the
violation.' 14 7 If the operator fails to meet the required correction
date, the state must order the cessation of the operation or that
part of it relevant to the violation.'4 8
These requirements are a significant departure from previous
Pennsylvania practice primarily because they require the abatement of violations within a time certain. Under the old program,
DER usually would issue a notice of violation, which was a letter
informing the operator of the existence of the violation and requesting the operator to inform DER how he planned to correct
it. Because the notice of violation imposed no affirmative obligation upon the operator, both DER and the operator frequently
ignored it for long periods. Because of DER's ability under the
old program to deny licenses and permits based on uncorrected
operators frequently did not begin to correct violaviolations,
tions unless they needed a license or permit from DER. In the
meantime, serious environmental pollution' was often occurring.
Notices of violation had one thing in their favor, however; they
were not appealable and thus did not contribute to DER's al150
ready substantial litigation burden.
DER had several reasons for initially objecting to SMCRA's
144.

30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(2) (1982).

145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. § 1271(a)(3).
148. Id.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 134-36.
150. See, e.g., Sunbeam Coal Corp. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 8 Pa.
Commw. 622, 304 A.2d 169 (1973).
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system of issuing orders. First, DER already had broad authority
under its mining statutes to issue orders to the extent necessary
to enforce those statutes.15 1 SMCRA, by contrast, required the
issuance of orders when there were imminent dangers or imminent environmental harms--a more limited class of cases than
that encompassed by DER's authority. Until recently, for example, federal law did not require the issuance of a cessation order
for mining without a permit;" 2 issuance of cessation orders for
mining without a permit was a basic feature of the Pennsylvania
program before primacy. DER was concerned that any post-primacy order that did not fit SMCRA's requirements might be
challenged as arbitrary or without legal authority.
DER's critical response to the federal language was also based
on practical litigation concerns. DER was concerned that issuing
large numbers of orders would generate a flood of appeals and
break down the whole enforcement system. Under Pennsylvania
law, orders are appealable because they affirmatively obligate
coal operators to take specified actions.' 53 Because the new system would require the issuance of a much larger number of orders than had ever been issued, that concern was very real.
DER was also concerned that its burden of proof in individual
cases would be overwhelming in the new system. In designing an
enforcement program, it is important to minimize an agency's
litigation burden in individual cases. Enforcement should be
based on easily proven violations of simply stated rules that contain few elements, with as few factual or affirmative defenses as
possible. 6 4 In addition to proving (1) the existence of a violation, no attorney wants to be obligated to prove that the violation was (2) significant, (3) imminent, (4) causing harm, and (5)
related to land, air, or water resources.
These objections were resolved in a way that reconciled the
federal program with prior Pennsylvania law. In general, all violations must be corrected within ninety days. 55 DER main151. See Clean Streams Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.610 (Purdon Supp. 1985);
Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1396.4b(a)
(Purdon Supp. 1985).
152. See 45 Fed. Reg. 18,555 (1982) (codified at 30 C.F.R. § 843.11(a)(2) (1985)).
153. See. e.g., Gateway Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 41 Pa.
Commw. 442, 399 A.2d 802 (1979); Man O'War Racing Ass'n v. State Horse Racing
Comm'n, 433 Pa. 432, 250 A.2d 172 (1969).
154. See supra text accompanying note 98.
155. 25 PA. CODE § 86.211 (1985). When OSM promulgated regulations concerning
the 90-day abatement requirement, it created five narrow exceptions. 30 C.F.R.
§ 843.12(c), (f) (1985). Section 86.211 contains only two of these exceptions. The court in
Pennsylvania Coal Mining Ass'n v. Watt, 562 F. Supp. 741, 747-48 (M.D. Pa. 1983), up-
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tained its broad authority to issue orders, but issuance of orders
in more serious cases is mandatory. 15 These more serious cases
are defined categorically by performance standard, and include
such violations as nonconcurrent backfilling, inadequate erosion
and sedimentation controls, acid mine drainage discharges, and
mining without a permit. These more serious violations correspond to, but encompass a larger class than, the violations described by imminent danger or imminent environmental harm.
DER must also issue orders for other violations if their correction time is between thirty-five and ninety days. When an order
is required, it is produced on a form 1 7 that enables issuance of
the order in the field without prior attorney review. The form
includes blanks for a description of the violation, a citation to
the appropriate regulation, the required corrective action, and a
required correction date. A guidance document15 provides standard language for inspectors to use in issuing field orders for the
most common violations. The field order form was developed at
DER's initiative and ensures that such orders can be issued
expeditiously.
All other violations are identified on inspection reports, which
include a suggested correction date that cannot exceed thirtyfive days from the date of violation. DER has some flexibility to
change the correction date if requested to do so before the date
occurs.1 59 But failure to meet the correction date must result in a
cessation order. If the violation is corrected, no further compliance action is necessary. This is more stringent than the
SMCRA requirement that violations other than those involving
imminent danger or significant environmental harm result in a
notice fixing a reasonable time not to exceed ninety days for
compliance.
DER's reconciliation of its prior program with federal law has
worked better than expected. A large number of violations are
corrected quickly and without further enforcement activity. In
1984-1985, for example, DER issued 1570 compliance orders, the
great majority of which were corrected without additional action
by DER. 6 ' In 1978, by contrast, DER issued 1062 notices of vioheld Pennsylvania's authority to draft § 86.211 more stringently than the federal
regulation.
156. See supra note 151; 25 PA. CODE §§ 86.212-.213 (1985).
157. Copy of form on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.
158. Copy of guidance document on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.
159. If the correction time for a violation identified on the inspection form takes
more than a total of 35 days, however, DER can only extend the correction date by
order.
160. 1985 OSM PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 43, at 51. DER also issued 458
cessation orders in 1984-1985. Id.
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lation and an undetermined but much smaller number of orders.16 At that time, most of DER's orders were directed at
mining-without-permit violations or acid mine drainage discharges. Orders are now directed against a wider range of violations, suggesting that the program does a better all-around job
of environmental protection. With rare exceptions, DER field
staff issue the orders competently.1 62 In fact, the field order in
the mining program is the only DER order that is issued without
involvement of regional office administrators and without prior
attorney review. Resolving minor violations through inspection
reports has also worked well. Relatively few violations that are
identified in inspection reports result in failure-to-abate cessation orders because operators are interested in avoiding further
enforcement action.
The enforcement system is also causing a closer correspondence between coal operators' legal obligations and the practice
in the field. For example, DER is more and more exercising the
authority to require permanent treatment of acid mine drainage,

which was upheld in Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co.1 63

DER has issued an increasingly large number of acid mine
drainage treatment orders in recent years. Not long ago, however, the Barnes & Tucker treatment facility was one of very few
such facilities in Pennsylvania. This development has also increased operator awareness of the importance of preventing acid
mine drainage in the first place.
The new system, in addition, has resulted in a more credible
permitting process. Most permit conditions under the new system are site-specific environmental protection requirements
designed to ensure that performance standards are met. Because
most of these permit conditions pertain to the site's potential for
acid mine drainage, violations will result in a field compliance
order. Issuance of orders for violations of permit conditions
helps ensure the integrity of the permitting process; operators
and their consultants tend to be more careful of what they propose in their permit applications because they know that it will
be enforced in the field. Under the prior system, permit conditions were frequently not enforced, or were not enforced through
compliance orders. There is now much less disparity between
what is written in the permit and what is enforced.
161.
162.
163.

Rieger memorandum, supra note 119.
1985 OSM PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 43, at 51.
455 Pa. 392, 319 A.2d 871 (1974); see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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Some administrative problems with this system have been resolved in recent years. For example, orders are issued more
quickly and efficiently now that they are issued from the field
rather than from regional offices. The system has nonetheless
been administratively difficult. Although only a small fraction of
DER's orders are appealed, the Agency's litigation load has unquestionably increased because of the proliferation of orders and
other DER decisions. In 1984-1985, 253 appeals of DER coal
mining decisions were taken to the EHB, representing at least
one-third of the appeals in that year from all DER decisions."6 4
The disproportionate number of coal mining appeals is made evident by the fact that the coal program is only one of about a
dozen major regulatory programs administered by DER, including air quality, water quality, solid and hazardous waste, and
mine safety. In addition, there may still be some disparity between the written program and the program in the field concerning follow-up on less serious violations. And there continue to be
complaints that the ninety-day compliance requirement is sometimes unworkable. In the beginning, these complaints stemmed
from the horrible compliance situation that some operators
found themselves in during the transition to the new program. It
was impossible to backfill or seed thousands of unreclaimed
acres in ninety days. As the program has gotten underway, however, these complaints have given way to claims that even temporary treatment of certain technically difficult acid mine drainage problems is not possible within ninety days.
Such difficulties do not negate the overall effectiveness of the
rule, however. Requiring compliance within ninety days means
that most violations are corrected quickly and with relatively little environmental damage.
E.

Civil Penalties

SMCRA substantially expanded the scope and flexibility of
DER's prior civil penalty assessment authority. Under SMCRA,
164. Telephone interview with Maxine Woelfling, Chairman, Environmental Hearing
Board (Oct. 29, 1985). About half of the Board's caseload from the mining program in
1984-1985 stemmed from orders (129 out of 253 mining appeals). The next major contributor was bond forfeitures (56 appeals), followed by permit issuance (27) and permit
denial (12). 1985 OSM PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 43, at 85.
Although the new program also contains provisions for citizen suits, see, e.g., Surface
Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1396.21 (Purdon
Supp. 1985), very few citizen suits have been filed. The fact that DER decisions under
the new program drew 253 appeals to the EHB in one year suggests that litigation is
being channeled through that forum.
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a civil penalty of up to $5000 per day may be assessed for each
violation, but actual assessments are required in only two situations. First, if the violation leads to the issuance of a cessation
order, a civil penalty must be assessed. 16 5 Second, if an operator
fails to correct a violation within the prescribed time period, a
civil penalty of at least $750 per day must be assessed for each
day thereafter that the violation continues. 66 Significantly, any
operator who seeks to appeal a civil penalty assessment is required to pay the penalty into an escrow account or forfeit all
legal rights to contest either the violation or the amount of the
penalty. The penalty is to be returned with interest if the opera16 7
tor prevails in the appeal.
DER adopted this system but modified it to improve its effectiveness. First, and most fundamentally, the civil penalty system
complements the issuance of orders. When any order is issued, a
civil penalty must be assessed. The civil penalty system is thus
directed primarily at the most significant violations. When a violation is identified on an inspection report and corrected on
time, a civil penalty is almost never assessed. Second, DER's
new program requires the assessment of a minimum mandatory
6
civil penalty of $2000 per acre for mining without a permit."
Procedurally, DER is required to send a notice of proposed
assessment to the operator and provide an opportunity for an
informal conference if the operator requests one. DER is required to post a notice in the regional office five days prior to
the conference and allow any interested citizen to participate. If
the civil penalty cannot be settled at the conference, DER is to
send a formal civil penalty assessment to the operator. 69
DER's civil penalty authority under the old program was more
limited. Although the Clean Streams Law allowed for civil penalties, the State's Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation
Act did not. As a result, civil penalties could only be assessed for
165. 30 U.S.C. § 1268(a) (1982). The amount of this penalty is not stated in the Act.
166. Id. § 1268(h).
167. Id. § 1268(c). The federal courts have sustained this requirement against challenges that it deprives operators of due process. See, e.g., B & M Coal Corp. v. Office of
Surface Mining Reclamation & Enforcement, 699 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1983). The Pennsylvania courts have also sustained the State's counterpart to the "prepayment" requirement. Boyle Land & Fuel Co. v. Commonwealth, Envtl. Hearing Bd., 82 Pa. Commw.
452, 475 A.2d 928 (1984), afl'd, 507 Pa. 135, 488 A.2d 1109 (1985).
168. See Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52,
§ 1396.22 (Purdon Supp. 1985); Clean Streams Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.605(b)
(Purdon Supp. 1985). The minimum civil penalty provision is in 25 PA. CODE § 86.193(e)
(1985). The new program also provides for minimum civil penalties in certain related
cases. Id. § 86.193(d), (f).
169. 25 PA. CODE § 86.201 (1985).
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water-quality-related violations. Even then, DER could not assess civil penalties; DER had to bring a civil penalties action
before the EHB. 17 0 There was no provision for "prepayment" of
the civil penalty. Finally, none of the civil penalty assessment or
public notice procedures existed.
DER has greatly increased its collection of civil penalties
under the new program. In 1984-1985, DER received more than
$425,000 in civil penalties, compared to $10,000 in 1978.11 The
mandatory civil penalty assessment provision in the new Pennsylvania program for significant violations has meant more frequent assessments for water quality violations. Civil penalties
are also being assessed for a range of significant nonwater-quality-related violations for which there was no previous assessment
authority.
The new civil penalty program probably has had some deterrent effect on most operators, although the extent of its deterrent value is the subject of some dispute. Avoiding unnecessary
costs is a concern that most coal operators share, but civil penalties are perhaps most effective as a deterrent to violations by the
more responsible operators. It also appears that the minimum
civil penalty for mining without a permit, together with increased inspection frequency, has significantly reduced the number and seriousness of off-permit mining violations. All the
same, many within DER believe that the requirement for permit
or license denial based on outstanding violations or a history of
violations has much stronger deterrent value than civil penalties.
As is the case with other aspects of DER's enforcement program, some problems remain to be solved. Most significantly,
DER's initial procedure for issuing formal assessments has
proven too cumbersome for the volume of assessments that need
to be processed. OSM has identified a backlog of 1433 cases
where DER has not issued a formal civil penalty assessment
when settlement proved impossible. 72 The $425,000 or so that
DER collected in 1984-1985 represents only one-third of DER's
1917 proposed civil penalty assessments in that period.1 73 Although the prepayment requirement undoubtedly played a role
in persuading many operators to settle, two-thirds of the proposed assessments were not settled. In early 1986, DER was conClean Streams Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.605 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
See Rieger memorandum, supra note 119; 1985 OSM PENNSYLVANIA REPORT,
supra note 43, at 78.
172. 1985 OSM PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 43, at 78.
173. Id. at 80. This third of the civil penalty cases were settled at informal conferences for 91% of the total penalty proposed for those cases. Id.
170.

171.
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sidering ways to streamline its procedure for issuing formal civil
penalty assessments.
Another issue raised by OSM relates to the required $750 per
day civil penalty for failing to meet a correction date. When an
operator fails or refuses to correct the underlying violation, the
required civil penalty grows every day, often out of proportion to
the underlying violation. As a result, DER has often capped
these civil penalties at thirty days, or $22,500, although DER
has not capped civil penalties for violations unless they have
been corrected by the time capping is proposed.' 74 In many
cases, DER has supplemented civil penalties with license or permit denial based on outstanding violations, or with lawsuits to
compel compliance. OSM has nonetheless urged DER to amend
its program to respond more consistently and systematically to
these situations.1 7 5 In September 1985, DER submitted to OSM
a proposed program amendment that would require DER to initiate "alternative enforcement" action when it decided to cap
the failure-to-abate civil penalty at thirty days. 176 The correction
of such problems should help the civil penalty program, including its deterrent effect, continue to improve.
F.

Bond Forfeiture

SMCRA requires operators to post a performance bond for
each mining site in an amount sufficient to ensure the completion of the reclamation plan if the operator does not do so.
SMCRA also allows states to set up alternate systems that will
achieve the purposes of a bonding program.' 77 If the operator
fails to comply with the applicable law, the state is required to
forfeit the bond.'7 8 Pennsylvania law contained comparable re174. Id. at 81.
175. Id.
176. Letter from Gary L. Merritt to Robert J. Biggi (Sept. 30, 1985) [hereinafter
cited as Merritt letter] (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.). According to the terms of
the proposed program amendment, DER may cap at 30 days the mandatory $750 per
day civil penalty for failure to correct a violation within the required time under two
circumstances. First, DER may cap the civil penalty if it has initiated separate civil penalty actions against the officers, directors, or agents of the violating operator. Second,
DER may cap the penalty if it has suspended or revoked the operator's permit, suspended or revoked the operator's license, filed an equity action in court to compel compliance, or initiated a criminal prosecution against the operator. Pennsylvania's mining
laws have criminal penalty provisions. See, e.g., Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1396.23 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
177. 30 U.S.C. § 1259(a), (c) (1982).
178. 30 C.F.R. § 800.50 (1985).
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quirements prior to primacy, and these requirements are gener79
ally still in effect.
DER has historically treated bond forfeiture as the enforcement tool of last resort. If notices of violations, orders, civil penalties, and, on occasion, criminal penalties do not achieve compliance at an active operation, then DER has forfeited the bond.
If the site has been abandoned, DER has forfeited the bond.
And once an operator's bond has been forfeited, that operator is
out of the business. 8 0 Unfortunately, as DER acknowledged in a
special report issued in October 1985, the bonds have historically been inadequate to reclaim the sites for which they were
posted.' 8 ' Ensuring that the present bonding system works and
reclaiming sites for which bonds were previously forfeited are
major program needs.
DER began to address that issue in the late 1970's. In a series
of actions from 1977 to 1981, DER increased the bond rate from
about $500 per acre to a minimum of $3000 per acre.' These
bond increases applied to new permits; existing permits remained at their previous bond level. In 1981, the regulations
were amended to require each permit applicant to pay a $50 per
acre reclamation fee as a supplement to bond forfeiture proceeds. 8 ' The primary advantage of the fee is that it provides a
flexible income source that can be used on any bond forfeiture
site, while bond forfeiture proceeds can only be expended for the
179. Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52,
§ 1396.4(d), (h) (Purdon Supp. 1985); 25 PA. CODE §§ 86.149, .181 (1985); see also
Morcoal Co. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 74 Pa. Commw. 108, 459 A.2d
1303 (1983).
180. An operator who forfeits a bond generally cannot obtain a permit under Pennsylvania law because it had failed and continued to fail to clean up the site for which the
bond was forfeited. Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act, *PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 52, § 1396.3a(b) (Purdon Supp. 1985).
181. BOND FORFEITURE PROGRAM, supra note 18, at 13. Bonds are apparently inadequate in many states. See Webber & Webber, Promoting Economic Incentives for Environmental Protectionin the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act: An Analysis
of the Design and Implementation of Reclamation Performance Bonds, 25 NAT. RESOURCES

J. 389 (1985).

Two pending cases challenge various aspects of DER's bond forfeiture reclamation
program. In Graham v. Jones, No. 72 T.D. 1981 (Pa. Commw. transferred from Clearfield
County Court of Common Pleas on October 20, 1981), a class action brought by landowners for whom surface mining bonds were forfeited without subsequent reclamation, plaintiffs are generally seeking to have DER formalize its priorities and procedures for reclamation of sites. In Pennsylvania Fed'n of Sportsmen's Clubs v. Pennsylvania Dep't of
Envtl. Resources, No. 1868 C.D. 1981 (Pa. Commw. filed July 30, 1981), plaintiffs seek an
increase in DER's bond rate for surface mines.
182. BOND FORFEITURE PROGRAM, supra note 18, at i.
183. 25 PA. CODE § 86.17(b) (1985).
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reclamation of the site for which they were posted. 8 " Because of
lag time between permit issuance and bond forfeiture, the average per acre bond rate for 1984 forfeitures was about $900. At
the same time, DER's reclamation costs have averaged $7500 per
acre.' 8 5 The reclamation fee was intended to make up this difference. Neither the bond rate nor the permit fee have been increased since 1981 because, among other reasons, the coal industry has persuaded many people in and out of DER that further
increases would harm it.' 8"
In 1979, DER began to reclaim sites for which bonds had been
forfeited and collected. There was no such program for these
sites for many years because the available bond money for any
site was insufficient to pay for its reclamation. The money simply languished in a special fund. DER's initial effort gained momentum in 1981 when the reclamation fee began to bring in
more than one million dollars annually.18 7 Expenditure levels for
the bond forfeiture reclamation program now match or exceed
available funds. DER has also developed a procedure and a priority system for reclaiming sites. 188 Between 1979 and 1985,
89
DER reclaimed 1361 acres and replaced six water supplies.'
This effort does not keep pace with the forfeiture rate, however.
The bond forfeiture rate for permits issued under the old program has been much higher and more serious than expected. As
of June 30, 1985, DER declared forfeit bonds for about 28,000
acres. Virtually every forfeiture is based on a permit issued prior
to primacy.19 0 The high number of forfeitures can be traced
largely to undercapitalized coal operators that received permits
during the coal boom of the mid-1970's and went out of business
184. Compare Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
52, § 1396.18(b) (Purdon Supp. 1985) (bond proceeds generally required to be used for
area for which they were posted) with 25 PA. CODE § 86.17(b) (1985) (fee is to supplement bond forfeiture proceeds; no site-specific requirements).
185. BOND FORFEITURE PROGRAM, supra note 18, at 13.
186. In early 1982, less than one year after the $50 per acre permit fee went into
effect, DER concluded that a higher fee was necessary to provide funds to reclaim sites.
DER's proposal to increase the fee to $150 per acre was strongly opposed by the coal
industry, and DER withdrew the proposal. Id. at i. The coal industry argued that the
increased fee would harm coal operators. The industry also argued that DER's data base
did not provide sufficient support for increasing the fee. One purpose of DER's 1985
report on the bond forfeiture issue was to provide a better data base for making decisions about the problem.
187. See id. at iii, 24.
188. On April 26, 1986, the State published proposed regulations concerning the procedures and priority system. 16 Pa. Admin. Bull. 1501.

189.

BOND FORFEITURE PROGRAM,

190.

Id. at 4-5.

supra note 18, at iii.
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when the coal boom collapsed.""' Because of the repermitting of
existing operations under primacy to meet the new requirements, the forfeiture rate has been particularly high in recent
years. Repermitting caused DER to inventory all outstanding
permits and brought to light many abandoned sites. In 1984, for
example, DER declared forfeit bonds covering 5570 acres. 92
Under the old enforcement program, sites often lay abandoned
for years while inspectors tried to look for another operator to
take over. The new program has forced those sites into forfeiture, even though they may have been abandoned long before.
DER views these bond forfeitures as the result of the old regulatory program. DER hopes that the current bonding system will
enable reclamation of all primacy permits for which bonds are
forfeited, given the requirements of the new program. This thesis was still untested in early 1986,193 but there are reasons to
believe that the new program may reduce the burden of future
forfeitures. The new enforcement program should discourage
forfeitures and ensure that forfeited sites are less expensive to
reclaim because they are in a better state of compliance. Because
all permits in existence under the new program will have a minimum bond of $3000 per acre, moreover, the difference between
the cost of reclamation and the amount of forfeited bond will be
less. The forfeiture rate is difficult to project, however. DER
therefore has suggested possible changes to the bonding system
if new program forfeitures exceed available funds. These possible changes include raising the reclamation fee, establishing a
severance tax, and amending DER's bond release policy.19 4
Reclamation of the sites that have already been forfeited will
be a difficult problem. Some of these sites have been or will be
reclaimed by operators through consent orders, repermitting,
and other means. Some of these sites have been, or are being,
reclaimed by DER. DER nonetheless estimates the State's reclamation obligation for preprimacy bond forfeitures to be 14,765
191. Id. at 1-2.
192. Id. at 5.
193. As part of repermitting under primacy, all previously issued permits for which
mining continued for at least eight months after primacy were required to obtain new
bonds at current bonding rates. For surface coal mining operations, repermitting was not
substantially complete until mid-1985. In early 1986, there was not yet an information
base of forfeitures under the new program sufficient to lead DER to conclude that the
bond rate or permit fee, or both, needed to be increased. If the forfeiture rate with primacy permits exceeds 250 acres per year, the existing bond rate and permit fee will need
to be changed. Id. at 18-19.
194. Id. at 15-20.
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acres. If these sites cost $7500 per acre to reclaim, the cost to
reclaim them is approximately $110 million. 9 5
DER's special 1985 report invited public discussion on two issues. First, what is an appropriate time frame for reclaiming
these sites? This question involves trade-offs between the desirability of immediate reclamation and the manageability of a
large-scale reclamation program.1 9 6 Second, who should pay for
reclamation? Many in the coal industry argue that active operators should not be responsible for those that forfeited bonds and
are out of the business. They have thus suggested that a bond
issue or an appropriation from the general fund would be appropriate. Environmentalists, on the other hand, believe that the
public should not pay for the sins of the coal industry. They
have suggested a severance tax, a higher reclamation fee, or
some other mechanism that uses the industry as a source of
funding.1 9 7 These issues, which will necessarily require the participation of the legislature, are likely to be difficult and controversial. OSM may even become involved in the resolution of
these issues.198
The bond forfeiture problem also indicates that the new enforcement program needs to be made more effective against the
most intransigent operators. This is not to say that rigorous enforcement should be used as a substitute for examination of the
bonding system; forfeiting a bond is much easier than chasing
assets that may no longer exist. Rather, such enforcement may
make it harder for operators to walk away from sites, and on
occasion supplement, bond forfeiture proceeds through additional civil penalties and other means. The recently submitted
amendment on alternative enforcement may strengthen DER's
enforcement program against these operators.1 99
Id. at 9-13.
196. See generally id. at 13-14.
197. Id. at 14.
195.

198. 1985 OSM PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 43, at 30.
199. See Merritt letter, supra note 176. Alternative enforcement should not be understood as a panacea for the bond forfeiture problem, however. Bankruptcy is often a
major obstacle to this type of enforcement action. Although DER has persuaded a federal court that the automatic stay provisions of the federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
§ 362 (1982 & Supp. II 1984), do not apply to actions seeking reclamation of surface
mine sites, Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir.
1985), DER has had precious little success actually obtaining reclamation by pursuing
operators into bankruptcy court. In one case, a court told DER, in effect, to raise bonds
for surface mining rather than seek assets through bankruptcy proceedings. In re Zacherl
Coal Co., 15 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1830 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
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PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

The increased effectiveness of the new program depends on
more than its requirements and procedures. DER's coal mining
regulatory program staff has tripled under primacy, thereby providing a better opportunity for thorough permit reviews and sufficient enforcement. In addition, OSM oversight of the Pennsylvania program has reinforced and strengthened DER's commitment to implementation of the new program.
A.

Personnel

One of SMCRA's most important effects is based on the annual grant OSM awards DER for its regulatory program under
SMCRA.20 0 Because of that grant, DER's coal mining regulatory

staff increased from 109 to 279 between 1978 and 1984, almost a
three-fold increase. 201 This change has had an immeasurable im-

pact on DER's ability to carry out the new program.
The old program was seriously understaffed. A handful of people in DER's central office reviewed hundreds of permit applications annually. Permit reviews were less thorough than they
should have been partly because there was so little time given
the volume of applications and available staff. Inspectors were
each responsible for inspecting hundreds of operations, so that it
was difficult for them to visit a site more than once or twice a
year. The old regulatory program would have worked much better with the existing staff complement.
The staff increase has made possible a relatively rapid transition to the requirements of the new program because the new
staff members do not have a history with Pennsylvania's old coal
mining regulatory program. As a result, it is not necessary for
them to unlearn habits that are no longer acceptable, and there
is less internal resistance to the new program based on adherence to old norms than there otherwise would have been. Some
problems remain to be worked out, however. A generation gap
exists in some offices between many older personnel, who have
little formal education and who came from the mining industry,
and the younger staff, who have college degrees in technical
fields but who have little or no prior experience in the mining
200.
201.

See generally 1985 OSM PENNSYLVANIA
Rieger memorandum, supra note 119.

REPORT,

supra note 43, at 6.
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industry. Some veterans of the old program have been unwilling
or unable to embrace the new regulatory program. Some of the
newer people need to obtain more experience; being a regulator
requires good judgment as well as technical skills, and it often
takes time to develop that judgment. As many of the older personnel retire, and as the younger staff members gain experience
and in-house training, this problem should continue to diminish.
An additional benefit of the increased staff complement is the
technical competence of many of the newer staff. In recent
years, DER has attracted many intelligent and highly motivated
people to its coal regulatory program. As a result, DER's ability
to evaluate permit applications, make decisions about permit issuance, and decide when to take enforcement action has improved. This increased technical competence has been particularly important to Pennsylvania in the area of acid mine
drainage, where a thorough understanding of hydrogeological
principles and their application to specific cases is a fundamental prerequisite to running a sound regulatory program.
DER has used the staffing increase to reorganize its regulatory
program. In 1978 and 1979, DER created five field offices to handle all permit application reviews, permitting decisions, and enforcement -actions under its coal mining regulatory program.
Permit reviews are no longer handled from the central office,
and inspectors usually work from the district offices rather than
their homes. OSM did not require this reorganization, but OSM
made it possible.
The reorganization has been helpful in several ways. First, and
most importantly, by moving DER decisionmaking to the area
being affected, the field offices have improved access of citizens
as well as the coal industry to the decisions being made and the
people making them. Second, it has led to greater coordination
and information sharing between permitting and inspection
staff. This was much more difficult when permits were reviewed
from the central office while inspectors were in the field. Third,
by moving inspectors to the field offices from their homes, the
new system provides inspectors with organizational and moral
support from DER, which many of them previously lacked.
Complaints are heard about consistency among the district offices, but DER has attempted to ensure consistency through detailed program guidance on the implementation of particular
regulations and through periodic staff meetings.
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State/Federal Administration

Before SMCRA, Pennsylvania could run its coal mining regulatory program in almost any manner it chose. Prior to 1977, the
state legislature made a series of choices to control coal mining
more stringently. All of those choices, however, came from
within the State, and management of the program pursuant to
those choices was strictly a state prerogative."' 2
Pennsylvania now has a federally approved program that is
significantly different from the one it had in 1977. The State
cannot change that program without federal approval. 0 3 Pennsylvania must also change its program in response to any
amended federal regulations that are more stringent than its
own regulations.0 4 There is now a continuing federal presence in
the administration of the program; OSM has an office in Pennsylvania that does nothing but oversee DER's implementation of
the new program.
Intergovernmental relations under SMCRA must be based on
an understanding of the different and legitimate roles that the
states and the federal government bring to the implementation
process. Whatever else cooperative federalism may mean, 20 5 it
should not mean that conflict is necessarily undesirable. When
DER and OSM are able to share constructively their perspectives, as well as the limitations inherent in each perspective, the
program can work well. In fact, it is precisely because OSM and
DER have different perspectives that Pennsylvania is evolving a
better program than either the State or federal government
would have developed by itself.2 0 6
202. An important exception is the effluent limitations required by the Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1982), and 40 C.F.R. pt. 434 (1985).
203. 30 C.F.R. § 732.17(g) (1985).
204. Id. § 732.17(d)-(e).
205. For contrasting views on the role of states under SMCRA, compare Harris &
Close, Redefining the State Regulatory Role, 12 ENvTL. L. 921 (1982) with Squillace,
supra note 4. For an argument that some, but not all, states implement one cooperative
federalism statute more vigorously than the federal government, see generally Thompson
& Scicchitano, State Enforcement of Federal Regulatory Policy: The Lessons of OSHA,
13 POL'Y STUD. J. 591 (1985).
206. This is not to suggest that intergovernmental relationships are always easy or
without tension. One source of difficulty is the competing stereotypes some people on
each side hold about their counterparts. Some federal personnel see themselves as white
knights on a mission to rescue the public and the environment from what they believe to
be inept, lazy, and industry-oriented state agencies. Some state personnel see "the feds"
as arrogant and incompetent, concerned more about paper trails and "bean counts" than
environmental protection, and see themselves as being practical and solution oriented.
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OSM brings to the process a commitment to a minimum national program as well as a national perspective based on
SMCRA and OSM's experience since 1977. In its oversight capacity, OSM also has a fairly sophisticated auditing capability
for state programs and relatively little political accountability to
state government. What OSM lacks, however, is significant experience implementing a regulatory program.
Pennsylvania brings a different set of institutional strengths
and weaknesses to the process. Because of its long history of coal
mining regulation, DER has an institutional memory of what has
worked and what has not, and what the technical problems in
the field are. DER also brings a commitment to resolving
problems within the State. What Pennsylvania lacks, however, is
a commitment to, or experience with, a national program.
OSM's Pennsylvania field office takes its oversight responsibilities seriously. That office views the State's primacy application,
and the statutes and regulations submitted as part of that primacy application, as a commitment made by the State to implement its regulatory program in that form. OSM oversight thus
attempts to compare specific regulations and other program requirements with practice in the field. OSM's Pennsylvania office
has played a major and continuing role in encouraging, reminding, and prodding the State to implement its approved program. DER's innovative enforcement program, for example, was
prompted by OSM's criticism of a prior enforcement program.
The flexibility SMCRA allows states helps ensure their ability
to run an effective regulatory program. It is unreasonable to expect that Congress and the OSM regulation writers anticipated
every major implementation problem that might be faced, or
that they designed programs that cannot be improved. It is also
unreasonable to expect that states will abandon important regulatory provisions not inconsistent with SMCRA simply because
they are not contained in SMCRA.2 01 Pennsylvania has improved the SMCRA model in many ways, including, for example,
a streamlined method of defining imminent danger and significant environmental harm, 0° broad authority to issue orders ,209
mandatory civil penalty assessment for all violations that lead to
orders, 1 0 minimum mandatory civil penalties for mining without
207. See Tarlock, National Power, State Resource Sovereignty and Federalism in
the 1980's: Scaling America's Magic Mountain, 32 KAN. L. REV. 111, 121 (1983).
208. See supra text accompanying and following note 156.
209. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
210. See supra text following note 167.
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a permit,2 1 1 authority to issue or deny licenses,21 2 protection of
public water supplies from underground mining, 21 3 mandatory
written notice to water supply users that pending permit applications might, if issued, affect their water supplies,2" 4 and a
novel permitting procedure that should encourage operators to
21 5
reduce water pollution from abandoned mines.
Unfortunately, OSM has not always been sensitive to Pennsylvania's implementation concerns, even though SMCRA specifically requires OSM to assist states in implementing their regulatory programs.2" Environmentalists often understand claims
about state implementation needs to be code language for an underlying bias against imposing meaningful requirements on the
coal industry. But what is meant here is quite different.
To begin with, OSM undertook extensive revisions of its 1979
permanent program regulations in the early 1980's after President Reagan's election, just as Pennsylvania and other states
were seeking and obtaining primacy under the 1979 regulations.
Although Pennsylvania adopted a few of those changes in 1982
prior to obtaining primacy, it has prevented significant disruption of its regulatory program by not adopting them wholesale.21 7 This constancy in the program has eased implementation
because it takes considerable time to actually get a program implemented in the field. After regulations are amended, permit
application forms and related guidance documents must also be
amended. But more importantly, the mine foremen, bulldozer
operators, blasters, truck drivers, and other people who are to do
the work required by the new regulations, must be taught what
they mean and how they are to be applied. A regulatory program
that is constantly changing in major ways can make that process
difficult, particularly as the program gets underway.
Although many in DER saw some of OSM's revisions as a necessary corrective measure for certain overly technical regulations
promulgated in 1979, there is also concern that many of the new
211. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 134-40.
213. See supra note 71.
214. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
216. 30 U.S.C. § 1211(c)(9) (1982); see also id. § 1202(g) (a purpose of SMCRA is "to
assist the States in developing and implementing a program to achieve the purposes of
this Act").
217. See generally 12 Pa. Admin. Bull. 2473 (July 31, 1982). While many of the more
recently amended OSM regulations are less stringent than their predecessors, many are
not. In early 1986, DER was discussing with OSM the changes that DER must make to
its program because of the amendments.
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OSM regulations are too vague to be effectively implemented.
The OSM regulation requiring that backfilling follow coal mining by no less than sixty days,2 18 for example, was repealed.
OSM preserved only a regulation that tracked the language of
SMCRA, requiring merely that reclamation proceed "as contemporaneously as practicable with surface coal mining operations. ' 219 Such a vague performance standard is exceptionally
difficult to administer effectively. 22 0 Significantly, a federal court
has remanded this and other OSM regulations on the ground
that they do not provide states with sufficient guidance in administering their regulatory programs. 2 1
218. 30 C.F.R. §§ 816.101(a), 817.101(a) (1982) (repealed).
219. 48 Fed. Reg. 23,356, 23,357-58, 23,368, 23,370 (May 24, 1983) (repealing 30
C.F.R. §§ 816.101(a), 817.101(a) (1982)). OSM expressly preserved 30 C.F.R. §§ 816.100
and 817.100, which track SMCRA's contemporaneous reclamation requirement. 30
U.S.C. § 1265(b)(16) (1982).
220. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
221. In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1724, 1744-46 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal filed sub nom. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel, No.
84-5743 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 25, 1984) (and consolidated cases). The court concluded:
It is clear that Congress intended the states to have a major role in enforcing the
dictates of the statute. It is the Secretary's duty, however, to spell out those
requirements. Merely restating the statutory requirement that reclamation be
performed as contemporaneously as practicable, does not help the states in enforcing the Act's requirements. The reclamation schedules will include detailed
timetables, but the Secretary has not provided any guidance, in the regulations,
as to how to judge these schedules against the statutory standard.
Id. at 1745 (citation omitted).
There are other examples of this insensitivity to state implementation concerns.
SMCRA prohibits mining within certain distances of features such as occupied dwellings,
streams, schools, and cemeteries. These prohibitions, however, are all "subject to valid
existing rights." 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (1982). It is particularly important to define such an
exception mechanically because, in Pennsylvania, an average permit application might
involve half a dozen such protected features. To quickly and smoothly process permit
applications, the permit review staff should be able to determine easily whether an exception applies. Under the old OSM definition of "valid existing rights," as written in
Pennsylvania's regulations, an operator has valid existing rights if, among other things, it
applied for a permit for the area before Aug. 3, 1977. 25 PA. CODE § 86.1 (1985). Such a
rule is easy to apply because the underlying factual determination is straightforward.
In September 1983, however, OSM promulgated a new definition of "valid existing
rights." 48 Fed. Reg. 41,312, 41,349 (1983) (codified at 30 C.F.R. § 761.5 (1985)). According to the new definition, an operator has valid existing rights if the application of the
distance limitations would otherwise result in an unconstitutional taking of property
under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. It is hard to imagine a
test less appropriate for individual permit reviews. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (takings test involves "essentially ad hoc,
factual inquiries"); see also Diver, supra note 98. States will be in a much harder position to find a mechanical surrogate for the takings rule when OSM has failed to provide
any guidance. DER and certain citizen and environmental groups sought judicial review
of this definition. The court remanded the rule to OSM because it differed so radically
from the proposed rule that the public was effectively deprived of an opportunity for
comment. In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig. II, 22 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1557, 1560-64 (D.D.C. 1985).
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OSM also needs to give more serious thought to the real world
effectiveness of the Pennsylvania program and to future program direction, particularly in its annual oversight reports. On
one hand, the annual reports are highly detailed evaluations of
major program elements, identifying areas where the program
has improved and areas where improvement is still necessary.
On the other hand, the reports tend to make comparisons with
only the previous reporting year, which means that they are bereft of any serious analysis of long-term program changes. The
detailed evaluations of individual program elements, moreover,
are not accompanied by any analysis of actual or potential environmental impacts. This omission is important because it is generally impossible to implement all needed improvements simultaneously. If OSM paid more attention to actual environmental
effects, it would likely have a better idea of how to assist the
establishment of implementation priorities. OSM would also
have a more informed view about the proper balance between
environmental protection and paperwork. In addition, studying
environmental effects would give OSM a better idea of how well
its regulations are actually working when they are implemented,
and would help develop a better data base upon which to develop regulatory proposals to implement SMCRA more fully and
effectively.
Finally, and most basically, OSM should reassess the interstate uniformity of its oversight process, particularly because
SMCRA was premised in large part on the need for minimum
national standards. Many in the Pennsylvania coal industry,
DER, and the State's environmental groups believe that the
State runs a more stringent program under SMCRA than many
of the other Appalachian States. The State's coal industry has
vehemently complained about differences between the Pennsylvania program and other Appalachian State programs. Much of
the responsibility for this apparent disparity can be attributed
to less rigorous OSM oversight in other states. Former Secretary
of the Interior James Watt's decision to replace regional oversight offices with state oversight offices in all likelihood contributes to this problem. The premise of SMCRA cannot be realized
unless all states are operating by its rules.2 22
222. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, National Wildlife Fed'n v.
Hodel, No. 86-169 (E.D. Ky. filed July 7, 1986) (alleging multiple violations by OSM of
oversight requirements and other SMCRA provisions in Kentucky and other states).

SUMME R

1986]

Cooperative Federalism
CONCLUSION

SMCRA is an ambitious statute. It identifies serious environmental problems from unregulated coal mining, establishes a
thorough and complex regulatory program for controlling those
problems, and generally entrusts the administration of that program to the same states that had previously been unable to effectively regulate mining. The magnitude of the task is enormous, even in a state such as Pennsylvania that in 1977 was said
to have had the best regulatory program in the country. The
task is also time consuming; it takes years to implement fully
such a comprehensive statute. Yet Pennsylvania's progress to
date can be traced in significant part to the constructive manner
in which the State has responded to many of SMCRA's
requirements.
Pennsylvania may or may not still have the nation's best coal
mining regulatory program. But its program is far superior to
that which existed in 1977. As a result, coal mining appears to
cause fewer environmental problems in the State than it did in
the past. And although the new program has had some adverse
effects on the coal industry, the principal factor affecting production appears to be the demand for coal.
This Article has shown that the new program is more environmentally protective than the old program in a number of major
areas, including permitting, performance standards, enforcement, and administration. Although the scope of the environmental protection requirements in the new program is somewhat
increased, the primary changes are in program design and administration. These changes are interdependent, and they suggest that the new program, taken as a whole, is premised on a
significantly different regulatory theory than that which characterized the old program. These changes also suggest ways in
which other environmental protection programs might be made
more effective.
First, enforcement decisions in the new program are based on
a comprehensive strategy that requires categorical enforcement
responses to all violations, rather than ad hoc discretionary enforcement decisions in individual cases. If certain performance
standards are violated, for example, DER must issue a corrective
order. Whenever an order is issued, a civil penalty must also be
assessed. This is more efficient and effective than addressing
problems on a case-by-case basis. Because the system is based
on increasingly severe responses for the more significant viola-
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tions, it creates significant incentives to avoid unlawful conduct.
It also helps to ensure that operators are treated in a reasonably
uniform manner.
Second, Pennsylvania's new regulatory program is more open
to outside scrutiny than the old program. Understandably, coal
operators have scrutinized the program for as long as it has existed, given that its requirements are imposed directly on them.
The new program, however, is more explicitly open to participation by other citizens during the permit application process,
through a petition process for designating areas as unsuitable for
mining, and during enforcement. OSM's oversight of the Pennsylvania program is continuing and. intensive. Scrutiny by
outside parties is greatly facilitated by the fact that the program
is largely in writing; it is now much easier to measure program
performance against the program's requirements. This scrutiny
reinforces the normative importance of the written requirements, and has reduced the gap that once existed between the
official program and the real program.
Third, the State's program is now managed and operated
more professionally than it was under the old program. This is
true in large part because the program is open to outside scrutiny, and based to a significant extent on systematic responses to
categories of violations. Increased staffing has also made it possible for individuals to perform properly the tasks to which they
are assigned, and has led to greater technical competence within
the program.
Fourth, the new program is primarily a written program. In
permitting, performance standards, and enforcement, DER administers statutes, regulations, and program guidance that prescribe what is lawful, what procedures must be followed, and
what happens if substantive or procedural requirements are violated. DER, the coal industry, and the public have a much
clearer understanding of what the new program demands and
how to respond. Under the old program, by contrast, there were
fewer regulations but more unwritten requirements. Bureaucratic folklore and oral tradition do not provide as much clarity
about program content as written requirements.
Fifth, the new program establishes mechanical rules rather
than judgment rules for many of its requirements. Even where
variances are allowed, DER seeks to define the variance in a
mechanical way. Such rules make planning easier for the operator and compliance determinations easier for DER. Mechanical
rules are particularly important in a high volume program such
as this one where too much individualized attention would cause
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the system to overload quickly. Significantly, it is in areas in
which the new program is not well defined, such as the meaning
of certain hydrologic balance requirements, that major implementation issues remain.
Sixth, the program provides for more and better information
before DER makes decisions. As a result, DER is making better
decisions. This is particularly true in permitting, but it is also
true in enforcement where a computerized data management
system is being put in place. DER's more extensive data requirements are also prompting the State's coal operators to plan future mining more carefully.
For all that, there remains a lingering concern that the new
program is sometimes unnecessarily systematized, inflexible, and
oriented toward procedure. A few cases do not fit the categories,
and a more discretionary system might yield more appropriate
results for them. In addition, the program's litigation load is a
growing issue.
These changes have nevertheless all contributed to the increased effectiveness of the new regulatory program. On a dayto-day basis these changes often seem imperceptible. The program continues to be controversial, raising problems that are
technically, legally, and politically difficult. The program will
continue to be criticized, fairly and unfairly. Yet over the longer
view, the difference is unmistakable. Though not without
problems, Pennsylvania's coal mining regulatory program is
much better than it used to be.

